CHAPTER SIX

HE KAUPAPA ĀRIA - A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The domain of developmental psychology is a modern, Western construction, which is itself contested and under revision, though currently often continually reinvented. Taking apart, challenging its scientific certainty and grip on common sense may help us to recognise other ways of talking about those issues that currently are dealt with within the terms of developmental psychology. Exploitation and oppression suffuse the structure of developmental psychology. Our task is to deconstruct it.

(Burman, 1994; 188)

If we have been gagged and disempowered by theories, we can also be loosened and empowered by theories.

(Azaldu’a, 1990; xxvi)

Kaupapa Māori as theory and praxis, is still evolving. Its full potential is yet to be realised and it provides some optimism for Māori with respect to the current education and schooling crises as well as Māori language, knowledge and cultural revitalisation aspirations.

(G. Smith, 1997; 486)

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to articulate a framework that does at least three things. The first is to provide a theoretical ‘way of looking’ that validates cultural ways of knowing and understanding. The second is to take cognisance of the enterprise of cultural and linguistic regeneration, the development and use of an indigenous, although not necessarily first, language. The third is to provide a method for analysing social interaction processes occurring in specified literacy activity settings, in relation to language development and use. The framework being developed in this chapter is more that of “a methodology, in the wider sense of a body of concepts and approaches, rather than a [singular] theory conceived as a formulated account” of causes and outcomes (Nash, 1997; 23). ‘Theory’ in which this framework is encompassed is best described as ‘kaupapa Māori’.
In the field of cultural psychology, a key endeavour is developing ways of identifying and studying cultural processes and influences on behaviour and learning. However, in this instance what is being sought is an approach from which development and learning aimed at meeting cultural goals and aspirations may be examined. They are not necessarily those of contemporary western societies, although they are at one and the same time located within such a society;

... the approach from cultural psychology has not yet been applied to minority cultures in which the mix of tools and interaction styles may reflect a mixture of cultural origins - some from the ancestral culture, some from the dominant society, and some from the power relations between ethnic minority and dominant society. Clearly, the relations between culture, socialisation, and development are much more complex for ethnic minorities immersed in a dominant majority culture. Because cultural psychology tends to look at the proximal aspects of culture... that is, those that are part of an individual's immediate stimulus situation, it is not conceptually ready to deal with the more distal layers of cultural and social structure that are required to explain the development of minority children in a majority culture.

(Greenfield, 1994; xiv)

While focusing on approaches within developmental psychology, this chapter is also the result of delving into ‘indigenous psychology’, ‘critical psychology’, ‘black psychology’, ‘feminist psychology’ and ‘Marxist psychology’. The search for what Māori-useful psychology might look like, ideologically, theoretically and methodologically, has resulted in ventures into many and various psychological areas of study across a range of perspectives. Why spend so much energy trying to make sense of what is arguably psychology, but not as developmental psychologists know it? Besides presenting an intellectual challenge, there is a major concern driving the re-search represented in this chapter. Along with other academics who have personal and genealogical histories involving colonisation or oppression, I am wary of contributing to theory-building and research endeavour that reaffirms an inequitable status quo (Mama, 1995; Prilleltensky & Fox, 1997).

What I am trying to do is to balance and address somewhat competing concerns. One, a concern to develop methodologically sound ways of analysing data that fit comfortably with my philosophical, ethical and cultural bents, so to speak. At the same time I think it
is imperative that these ‘bents’ are made explicit. Two, I want to interrogate critically the theoretical and philosophical bases of the methods. What I end up with in the following chapter is a kind of sceptical (some may argue not necessarily healthy) socioculturally oriented use of quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis, their use justified on the basis that I keep my concerns and biases explicit, another facet of reliability and validity checking.

The studies that form a substantial part of this thesis engage with threads of psychological inquiry which historically have contributed to a deficit-oriented, depressing view of Māori. Māori ‘families’, Māori ‘language development and use’ and Māori ‘literacy practices’ around books have all carried negative connotations that doggedly persist at the end of the twentieth century, just as they did at the beginning.

Thus, the goal is to weave together somewhat disparate strands of theory in a coherent and unifying way. The challenge is to integrate psychological approaches that seek to understand ‘developmental process’ as opposed to ‘developmental product’ and that at the very least acknowledge the significance of historical-political-societal processes in individual and cultural development, with kaupapa Māori theory that argues the legitimation of Māori world view(s).

**Developmental Psychology and me**

While it is not my intention for this thesis to plot the history of developmental psychology, a major challenge that I have felt as a Māori woman who chose to study developmental psychology has been working out whether there are effective ways to utilise it to help articulate and support Māori cultural and linguistic aspirations.

We must decide whether we want white knowledge or not. What parts we want and what parts we don’t want. And we must do so in the full awareness of the danger that is still there. That in going out to capture Pakeha knowledge one is infected by the colonial attitude to it.

(Awatere, 1984; 93-4)

A visit to Hawaii in early 1997 reinforced the idea that facing me in my attempt to write a doctoral thesis was the need to more explicitly examine my personal beliefs about the
usefulness of ‘developmental psychology’ for Māori. Māori share with many other indigenous people a history of colonisation, land alienation and near cultural and physical annihilation. We also have in common with many indigenous groups a persistent desire to regain language, cultural and political wellbeing. What kind of psychology would best serve, support and indeed, help to understand the commitment (as well as hostility) Māori have to ensuring that as a people, as a language and as a culture we continue to develop and to create and recreate who and what we are?

A daunting task, given the way psychology as an academic discipline has been utilised in the “pathologisation” of “groups [Māori having the dubious distinction of being one such group] on the basis of their failure to reflect the Western, middle-class norms that have structured developmental research” (Burman, 1994; 187). As a branch of psychology, a purportedly detached, objective and rational social science, developmental psychology has historically served pathologising agendas so well that one cannot help being suspicious of any stated neutrality on its part. For those of us who identify as belonging to ‘pathologised groups’, characteristics of psychological academic and research enterprise have made it an unattractive arena in which to work. For example,

[mainstream (that is, behaviourist) psychology was not amenable to investigating such issues as racism and oppression, the psychosocial reality of Black people, or the consequences of being an Afro-American. Thus it is readily apparent why so few Black Americans saw psychology as an attractive occupation. It was seen as a narrow, stifling field and in particular as insensitive to the themes most directly pertinent to Black Americans.

(Boykin, Franklin & Yates, 1979; 5, in Mama, 1995; 44)

It wasn’t until the mid-1970s that the first identified Māori obtained a postgraduate Masters degree in psychology (Stewart, 1995). As relatively late entrants into psychology when compared with African Americans (whose first PhD in psychology was obtained in the 1920s), Māori practitioners of psychology as opposed to practised upon, have also expressed similar sentiments (e.g. Awatere, 1981; Lawson-Te Aho, 1994; Stewart, 1995).

During the years I have been involved in teaching on undergraduate courses, developmental psychology was often subjected to criticism in predominantly Māori
classes for its failure to recognise the role of 'culture', 'colonisation', and 'power' in development in any significant way. Over the last two decades from my time as an undergraduate psychology student in classes with rats and pigeons in the late seventies, I have come to understand that rather than being apolitical and removed from notions of power (people and society), psychology is inextricably connected to, develops from and in turn contributes to power and power relations within society. A requisite for understanding the inherent nature and history(s) of the discipline 'Psychology' is understanding the 'power of discourse' and 'discourses of power' (Burman, 1994) that have supported the development of the 'powerful' positions held by, in this instance, conventional 'New Zealand-style' developmental psychology.

My early understandings of developmental psychology revolved around its three tenets; description, explanation and optimisation. What became clearer was that 'description' of Māori, when presented, was not always particularly flattering, much of the 'explanation' as to why we were like we were, insulting and 'optimisation' often really meant 'de-māorification'. My understandings of developmental psychology have always involved notions of change, although not necessarily always perceived as positive change.

In developmental psychology 'change' is located at the level of the individual, or in more recent times at the level of the immediate social contexts in which the individual develops and learns. At issue is whether conventional approaches in developmental psychology can be used as tools for changing existing socio-political orders, rather than simply a means by which 'descriptions', explanations' and ameliorative 'optimisations' for an existing order can be developed.

In terms of developmental psychological research, Burman (1994; 138-9) conceptualises power as "a position set out within relationships; in this case relationships structured by the history of psychology and the positions elaborated...within discourses of scientific research". Power is inextricably involved in what gets studied, the selection of critical developmental domains, the determining of research questions, what gets measured and how measurement occurs, the selective structuring of 'evidence' and what gets optimised. Rose (1990; 30) links the identification and development of optimisations with the
technologisation of development - the industry of developmental maximisation and acceleration along a specified, predetermined, 'normal' path or trajectory.

Within the identification of ‘important’ or ‘critical domains’ of development, power of discourses are evident in decisions made as to how these domains are defined and by whom. Power is played out in the domain of language development with which I am concerned. Power “structures the selection, production and investigation of language” (Burman, 1994; 139). A strategy for exploring “the ways in which power has entered into the structure” of psychology, particularly research, “is to recover multiple meanings that have been obscured.” (Burman, 1994; 146). The process of fulfilling the purpose set out for this chapter involves uncovering psychological practices for making meaning that can aid (or impede) a kaupapa Māori approach to the study of Māori development and learning;

psychology is a political, societal practice and our task is to make this clear and overt in our thinking, our practice, and our language. (Tolman, 1994; 24)

IN SEARCH FOR A PSYCHOLOGY THAT REFLECTS MĀORI REALITIES AND ANSWERS THE NEEDS OF MĀORI SOCIETY (modified borrowing from Enriquez, 1989; 105)

To return to the challenge described initially, to what extent can psychological theory and method be Māori-useful in the study of Māori development and learning? To misquote Tolman (1994), how do we ensure that developmental psychology in Aotearoa-New Zealand does not remain yet another discipline about us, but rather operates as a discipline for us?

Across a range of disciplines, growing numbers of Māori researchers and theorists are engaged in a process of developing ‘Māori centred’ as opposed to ‘Māori friendly’ theory. In a discussion around schooling and notions of difference, Patricia Johnston defines ‘Māori friendly’ as that which focuses predominantly upon “sensitising environments to the cultural needs of Māori students” and aims at improving “the life chances of Māori students through the sensitising process” (1998; 179). ‘Māori centred’ schooling places
“Māori at the centre; it recognises structural (as well as cultural) dynamics and locates them as pivotal to addressing Māori educational under-achievement (1998; 174). The stance of kōhanga reo as a whānau education provision and kura kaupapa Māori as a compulsory schooling provision is that Māori knowledge and cultural values and practices are valid and legitimate.

Kaupapa Māori theorising has arisen out of such Māori centred approaches to education and to other institutionalised systems in contemporary Aotearoa-New Zealand. Kaupapa Māori theory continues to develop out of flax roots initiatives that have emerged in response to Māori cultural, linguistic and educational aspirations. As ‘theory’ and ‘transformative praxis’, kaupapa Māori exists as much as theory and as structural intervention that makes space for cultural practice, as it does as cultural practice (G. Smith, 1997). Taina Pohatu (1996) argues that kaupapa Māori praxis should not be limited to the revitalisation of language, knowledge and culture within contexts of formal schooling, but needs to be extended into the socialisation of these within so-called informal contexts such as home and whānau (see also G. Smith, 1997; 98).

Thus kaupapa Māori doesn’t function simply as a theoretical framework, although it provides theoretical direction and underpins research agenda (L. Mead, 1996). It is a lived philosophy within many Māori homes, whānau, education and other Māori contexts. It certainly imbues many sociocultural contexts in which I live and of which I am a part. This chapter explores to what extent psychological theory can be integrated with theory that has an essential element which is simultaneously Māori, transformative and lived. The development of Kaupapa Māori theory has implications in efforts occurring worldwide to develop indigenous theoretical frameworks for the understanding and discussion of learning and development, that often cut across a range of traditional western disciplines and fields (e.g. Cajete, 1994, Enriquez, 1989, Pere, 1994).

Is one of the paths ahead the formation of ‘Kaupapa Māori Developmental Psychology’ as another related field of study? When met with charges of academic imperialism, and challenges to make their respective fields less dangerous and more relevant for Māori, some academics within psychological fields have shrugged them off on the grounds that there “is no such thing as Māori psychology”. What they generally mean is that there is
nothing presented as ‘Māori psychology’ in forms that they accept as legitimate and valid academic knowledge. A substantial written body of psychological literature about Māori, for Māori, and through the medium of Māori language has yet to be developed. However, [a] strict adherence to the union-card criterion of a psychologist would of course exclude not only a sizeable number of eminent thinkers in the Western tradition and scholars who obtained their degrees in history or anthropology in the specialized West, but also the unwritten but no less real psychologies of peoples who may not even have a tradition of publishing journal articles in psychology to speak of. The validity of unwritten psychologies does not depend on the extent and manner of their articulation.

(Enriquez, 1989; 69)

Contemporary western society holds the written word in high regard. This reverence contributes to ignorance and dismissal of the knowledge of cultures for which oratory may be held in similar regard, for which literatures exist in non-written forms, or for whom print literacy in their language is a recent practice. The dearth of written literature does not mean that Māori psychological models and concepts do not exist and are not valid and relevant.

An area termed ‘Indigenous Psychologies’ at first glance looked a promising place for exploring academic approaches to psychological knowledge and understandings of cultures such as Māori (e.g. Fulton, 1983; Heelas & Lock, 1981; Sampson, 1988).

One of the difficulties identified in Serge Moscovici’s foreword to Paul Heelas and Andrew Lock’s (1981; ix) ‘Indigenous Psychologies: The Anthropology of the Self’ is “how to ascertain the domain of the psychological”. “Psychology is bounded by culture and evolves with history, so varying from societies in which the individual is the psychological to those in which psychology is taken away from the human self”. It is argued that the psychologies of some cultures (societies or civilisations) are constructed within a ternary framework that includes the internal world of the individual, the external world and the spiritual, psychic world. Western psychological theories are essentially conceived in a binary cultural framework of exterior and interior worlds.
Many Māori students and educators with whom I have worked have commented that the developmental psychology they were expected to learn as part of their academic apprenticeship failed to acknowledge and account for development of spiritual domains. This is one site where theorising is limited, or where the primary focus is on religious, church and faith-related aspects of spirituality (e.g. Myers, 1997). The spiritual domain is viewed as critical for optimal Māori development (Nepe, 1991; Pere, 1994, 1997). Its significance is referred to explicitly in the philosophy of Kura Kaupapa Māori, ‘Te Aho Matua’.

On the surface, the study of indigenous psychologies looked as if it could be effectively drawn on to describe and theorise about Māori development and significant Māori psychological aspects, such as wairua, mauri, hinengaro. However, in Heelas and Lock’s book, discussions of such aspects fell under the label of Māori as an ‘exotic culture’. Furthermore, studies of various cultures’ psychologies in this vein have drawn heavily on anthropology. As an area of study described as ‘falling between the disciplines of anthropology and psychology’, there is a very real possibility that it is an ‘aka taepa’. Māori theorists such as Linda Smith (L. Mead; 1996) and Tereki Stewart (1995) critically discuss problems that anthropology and psychology have posed to Māori. Stewart proposes that the biggest challenge facing various approaches to the study of indigenous psychologies is that they “predominantly represent attempts by non-indigenous authors to capture what it means to be ‘indigenous’ and as a consequence they have contributed to the prescribing of ‘indigenous’ identities by voices external to the group being studied” (1995; 58).

Enriquez’ book on indigenous psychology (as opposed to psychologies) represents an alternative approach under the label ‘Indigenous Psychologies’. Rather than setting out to describe the Phillipine psyche as a particular indigenous psychological type, he details the development of psychology as an academic discipline in the Philippines. His discussion involves the examination of its colonial roots, tracing these to northern America, Germany, Spain and Belgium, back into the Philippines and through to the development of “Sikolohiyanong Pilipino”, Philippine Psychology. Enriquez’ work signals an alternative approach to indigenous psychology - one by indigenous people themselves who are
committed to political, economic and cultural development of their communities (Stewart, 1995).

Enriquez (1989) describes the development of psychological thought in the Philippines as a movement involving three primary areas of protest. Firstly, protest against a psychology that maintained the colonial status of the Filipino mind. This is seen as a move towards the decolonisation of the Filipino psyche and a stage of the development of national consciousness. Secondly, a move against the imposition of psychologies developed in and appropriate to other countries and societies, and finally against a psychology employed in exploiting the masses. The move to develop a liberating psychology resulted in the strategic use of Filipino language as a medium for identifying and describing Philippine realities in order to develop a psychological literature of the Filipino people and to identify and rediscover indigenous concepts.

Examples of Māori language being used in the identification and discussion of Māori psychological concepts abound. Many of these examples are authored by non-Māori or sourced to historical descriptions of traditional Māori, also written by non-Māori. Linda Smith (L. Mead 1996) again provides an in-depth analysis of such examples. Tuki Nepe (1991) and Rose Pere (1994) provide insider discussions of Māori concepts linked to socialisation, development and learning, although for the most part through the medium of English.

Herein lies one dilemma. The dangers of discussing, synthesising and communicating culturally valued knowledge and theoretical constructs through a high-status colonial language cannot be overstated. Issues raised in Chapter Four, relating to the development of written literature in te reo Māori, are as relevant when discussing an academic literature for psychology as they are when discussing literature for Māori children. Furthermore, Māori audiences for writings on ‘Māori psychology’ understand and are literate in English. However, growing numbers of us are developing deeper understandings in te reo Māori and if we ‘don’t use it we are in danger of losing it’. The need to reach an audience, contrasted with the need to validate and utilise the language, is being acknowledged in some Māori academic writing (e.g. Melbourne, 1991; Rei, 1998). Personally, while the desire and ideal is to present a thesis in te reo Māori, I have not
always felt capable or confident enough to write in my first language of literacy, English, let alone Māori, at the conceptually complex level demanded for example by a PhD.

Indigenisation of academia

For what purpose the development of ‘indigenous psychology’, be it Filipino, Māori or other? Is the aim to create relative psychologies applicable only to respective cultures - academic relativism? Or is the aim to develop a psychology responsive to indigenous culture and its realities, as suggested by Enriquez? Enriquez contends the development of indigenous Filipino psychology “does not advocate that foreign theories of behaviour should be discarded on the grounds of origin. Uncritical rejection is just as dangerous as uncritical acceptance of Western theories” (1989; 22).

Similarly, Girishwar Misra, writing on the development of indigenous Indian psychology, argues that rather than aiming to “generate a set of mutually exclusive, culturally based orientations” that disregard or are unappreciative of alternatives, cultural orientations being generated need to “intersect and interpenetrate” (Gergen, Gulerce, Lock & Misra, 1996; 96). How might such indigenisation of an existing academic discipline be achieved? Kaupapa Māori approaches in health, education and justice have attempted to identify and explore pathways to effect such an outcome (e.g. Bishop, 1996, L. Smith, 1991; 1998). Enriquez (1989; 70) provides a model of possible approaches as shown in Figure A below.

Two broad approaches are illustrated. Indigenous viewpoints can be developed from within an existing area of academic study and then utilised. Alternatively, the indigenous world may be the source of theoretical concepts and methods, which are then elaborated into theoretical frameworks for use and application. These two strategies position cultures in contrasting ways. Indigenisation from within casts culture as a source. Culture becomes the target when indigenisation from without is the strategy.
Figure A. Enriquez’ model for indigenisation

The sources and directions Enriquez proposes suggest almost a binary process or a kind of exclusive parallelism. That is, the process of indigenisation is unidirectional in nature where its course can be largely shaped by particular histories and circumstances. However, culture flow in one direction does not preclude flow simultaneously occurring in the other. In reality, while there could be a particular directional emphasis depending on the agenda or programme set, the process of indigenisation is highly likely to be composed of multi-directional interactions. Although Enriquez holds that the perspectives motivating either type of indigenisation illustrated in the table above can
work at cross-purposes, what I am arguing is that the two processes identified can also take place in some sort of interactive harmony.

What need to be examined are the benefits and dangers inherent in a strict adherence to either process orientation to indigenisation presented by Enríquez. For instance, exclusive attention to one could conceivably lead to what amounts to the uncritical transfer (translation) of non-Māori intellectual technology. Strict adherence to the other could lead to little more than sentimental revivalism of what is, or is perceived to be, ‘traditional Māori’ intellectual theorising, research methodologies and technologies. Dangers of ‘assimilation’, of ‘hegemony’, of ‘parochialism’ and of ‘cultural dogmatism’ abound. For me, the need to avoid both naive and inappropriate co-option and a sentimentalised attachment to the ‘past’ is critical.

Along the same vein, in relation to kaupapa Māori theorising it is perhaps timely to argue for a moving beyond viewing Māori knowledge, values and beliefs as valid and legitimate as a “taken for granted”. That is, a non-challenging, uncritical acceptance of what are common-sensibly perceived as Māori beliefs and so on, is not productive. As legitimate and valid, what count as Māori ‘world views’ deserve being shown the respect of vigorous interrogation, just as vigorous as non-Māori conceptual, theoretical and philosophical frameworks experience, from within a kaupapa Māori framework or the like.

To return to Enríquez’ model, taking a theoretically purist line in either direction is also at odds with the ‘real-life’ situations that Māori not only find ourselves in but in many instances choose to construct. These situations seldom reflect either a sense of ‘cultural purity’ in any traditional shape or form, or a whole-hearted embrace of ‘the new world’. As discussed in the previous chapter, Jennie Joe makes similar distinctions between imposed and selected changes and accommodations by indigenous North American cultures within a western national milieu.

For Māori who are involved in Māori designed educational initiatives, like those who participated in the studies reported in following chapters, the situation is often one of
actively using contemporary skills and technologies while working to reclaim and regenerate Māori values and beliefs, as well as the language for expressing these.

Some psychologists are calling for an approach that “celebrates the rich multiplicity of indigenous conceptualizations of the person along with varying means of acquiring knowledge” (Gergen, Gulerce, Lock & Misra, 1996; 496). There are exhortations to bring a sense of a global co-operative and dialogue to the practice of psychology. However, sometimes missing from these discussions is consideration of the differences in ‘power’ and ‘political clout’ held by those who might embark on such dialoguing. Tereki Stewart’s theoretical model of research and knowledge production for ‘indigenous psychology’ proposes the use of other-culture theories/methods/concepts as part of a process that remains under the control of indigenous groups themselves. This model identifies the importance of recognising “sociopolitical considerations through critical analysis”.

Indigenous people endeavouring to create proactive and emancipatory psychologies in support of their goals and aspirations have taken issue with the relevance and appropriateness of western academic approaches to psychology. The existence of differential power relations contained within the discipline is also identified as being at least of equivalent concern.

I am attempting to work within a discipline that has been defined outside of Māori worlds and am focusing on domains (language development and literacy practices) that have been identified as critical from non-Māori world views. I am searching for ways that ‘developmental psychology’ might be used effectively in the support of particular Māori aspirations to which I also adhere, reflecting very much the indigenisation from without that is schematically illustrated in the table above. At the same time I take a kaupapa Māori position, that includes not only viewing ‘Māori knowledge, beliefs and practices’ as valid and legitimate and fundamental to optimal Māori development and wellbeing, but also as open to informed, sensitive examination and debate. Furthermore, ‘language’ and ‘literacy’ are not only identified as significant sites of struggle by Māori, but also as significant to our contemporary existence as Māori.
Rather than working from a perspective that sees non-western, colonised cultures such as Māori as ‘recipients or targets of culture flow’ (Enriquez, 1989; 71), it is one of seeing Māori culture as dynamic, active and selective. This dynamism and selectivity extends to our engagements with theories, practices and concepts of a range of social sciences, including those grouped under the term psychology.

Focusing on development and learning, Figure B below attempts to illustrate this perspective of Māori engagement with developmental psychology. The relationship is not visualised as a linear one, where non-Māori psychological theory and technology impacts on Māori attempts to study, theorise and optimise development and learning at a specific, staged point in a sequenced process. Rather, the relationship is seen as one in which there is potential for reciprocal engagement and impact at many given points. Four possible points are illustrated.

What the model is attempting to show is that it is a relationship that involves multi-directional seepage, an exchanging, interchanging and blending of ideas. Indigenous approaches beyond being culturally appropriate, can contribute to the revision of western theories (Gulerce, in Gergen, Gulerce, Lock & Misra, 1996). The model represents a multi-dimensional interrelationship that involves interaction within, without and between any given point in the process. For any particular research agenda, each dimension provides mechanisms or benchmarks for checking and seeking resolutions for tensions that may arise. Such tensions include identifying processes of accountability to Māori as well as by Māori as researchers.

The interrelationships the model portrays are played out within a socio-political context that historically has positioned ‘Māori’, including Māori development and learning, in destructive and dis-empowering ways. As a result, while it is being argued that Māori approaches to development and learning have been of influence at least in Aotearoa-New Zealand, if not internationally, the direction of influence has been severely skewed in favour of ‘psychology’. The reasons for this rest not only in our history of colonial experience, but also in the history of the discipline itself.
Critiquing Psychology

Critiquing psychology is not an uncommon activity. In this chapter a ‘twin peaks’ perspective is being argued for, in that part of the critique comes from ‘without’, such as that from a kaupapa Māori theory approach, which involves processes of critiquing externally imposed definitions and constructions of Māori people, knowledge and practices (Pihama, 1993). Another comes from within.

Psychology has faced many theoretical and methodological challenges from those working in non-psychological disciplines, more noticeably since the 1960s. Members of groups who hold minority and relatively powerless positions in western societies have also attacked psychological theorising and researching, from the position of theorists and researchers who themselves work in fields of psychology (e.g. Joe, 1994; Mama, 1995; Squire, 1989). They have challenged their own discipline to be held accountable for
resulting negative portrayals of non-white, non-middle class, non-male groups and for damaging impacts on their development and learning, including those sustained by Māori (e.g. Awatere, 1981; Lawson-Te Aho, 1994; Stewart, 1995). For instance Māori psychologist Donna Awatere stated:

[humanism, psychiatry, behaviourism, and even other strands of psychology such as psychological testing, have been developed by and used by those who as a class hold the power over those who do not. Māoris at the receiving end of capitalism and of its offshoot racism, have also been at the receiving end of psychologists’ technologies, in whose interests they were developed and whose interests they serve.

(Awatere, 1981; 200)

Psychology is also subject to critical examination from those who work inside academic establishments and who belong to groups that hold power outside them. Tolman (1994) describes and discusses the critique of ‘bourgeois social science’ methodology emanating out of the writings of German critical psychologists. One of his major criticisms is directed at the inability of social sciences, including psychology, to determine the relationship between subjectivity and individual societality. Tolman’s discussions revolve around the relevance of the ‘individual’ and ‘society’ and the relationship between them. Much of what he terms ‘single-head’ contemporary psychology has been concerned with understanding what goes on in the [development of] perception, cognition and emotion of an individual, who happens to exist along with a whole lot of other single-heads.

Psychology as it is conventionally practised is seen as providing little in the way of solution. The laws it offers are essentially asocial and reductionist (Mama, 1995; Tolman, 1994). Behavioural approaches for example, exacerbate the problem through a preoccupation with the generality of laws of reinforcement. These tend to disappear differences between species, let alone between groups of people and between individuals within groups of peoples. Laws of reinforcement for instance, may tell us nothing about what makes us human and societal (and Māori). “What is relevant to most of us is not how we are like pigeons but how we differ from them” (Tolman, 1994; 18). Tolman argues that even when we consider the various kinds of psychologies that exist, we are
faced with the same problem, the isolation of individual subjects from their historical and societal contexts. This is identified as a result in part of a perceived need to generalise.

'Science', which psychology has laboured hard to be considered, has a fixation on generalisation. Science requires generalisation. Mainstream psychology closely links generalisation to abstraction in that neither can occur without the other. Particular properties of psychology, including development, cannot be isolated and abstracted without looking at a number of cases. And we cannot generalise about properties without firstly abstracting information. Tolman (1994) discusses how easy it is to move from concrete to abstract; how common sense the abstractions appear. The difficulty lies in applying generalisations about populations (of humans, rats and pigeons) to individuals (usually human). Suffice to say such applications can only realistically be done by way of prediction. How to overcome this? Tolman proposes re-orienting the relationship between the abstract and the concrete.

Generalisation does not move from the concrete to the abstract, but from the abstract to the concrete: the equation of abstract and general is rejected from the outset. The ultimate aim of science is accordingly not to achieve the general by abstraction, but to start with the abstract and make it general by tying it back to the concrete.

(Tolman, 1994; 138)

A way of achieving this aim is to locate development within real time, real places and real relationships, rather than approaching development of an individual as if it were abstract in essence, asocial, ahistorical and apolitical. Systems approaches and sociocultural perspectives to the study of development do go some way in achieving this by admitting culture has a fundamental rather than supportive role to play in development. In Aotearoa-New Zealand, Russian émigrés writing out of Northern America provide potentially useful ways to locate human development firmly in social contexts.

**Bronfenbrenner's Ecological Model**

Uri Bronfenbrenner's (1979) ecological model of development has been used in ways that assume Māori systems are valid and that 'normal' patterns of Māori development can be located in these contexts. It has been used to elaborate links between socio-political and
ideological systems and the developing Māori child and whānau (Ka’ai, 1990; Royal Tangaere, 1997b).

The model provides a platform from which to consider how non-immediate contexts impact upon and to some extent are impacted upon by developing individuals. It conceives the contexts of development and learning as nested systems and locates individuals within these systems. Systems are defined as “a complex whole made up of a set of interconnected parts”, where properties of the whole are greater than the individual parts (McNaughton, 1995; 200). This model enables a shift from an isolated focus on individual development to focusing on a developing individual as part of the contexts in which he or she develops. It has strong parallels with Māori approaches and philosophies about development that locate it in the interrelationships of individuals and groups (Royal Tangaere, 1997a). Optimal development is seen as being located within the strength and stability gained from being part of a larger social whole.

Relationships are a fundamental feature of Bronfenbrenner’s model. Development is affected by relationships and interactions between settings and across systems. Bronfenbrenner identifies “supportive links” as the critical element in optimal development and learning. The model provides a means to explain how change may occur and how change might be effected at a systems level.

While I also consider Bronfenbrenner’s model a Māori-useful theoretical tool, it is the theorising of another Russian ‘émigré’ that takes a more significant position within the framework this chapter is attempting to develop and describe. His theorising has begun to heavily influence developmental psychology in Aotearoa-New Zealand. In the second half of the twentieth century, arguably one of the most fertile patches of theoretical growth in western developmental psychology has been located around the writings and constructs of communist Lev Vygotsky.
SOCIOCULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT

This thesis draws on perspectives that have been variously labelled sociohistorical, sociocultural and co-constructivist (while to some extent interchangeable, these terms denote overlapping, rather than identical perspectives) to help develop a theoretical framework, research method and to analyse observational data. I could explain the attractiveness of these approaches in terms of cultural preference for holistic rather than analytic patterning of cognitive ideas (e.g. Maracle, 1990; Tharp, 1989). Suffice to say I have found such approaches attractive because they enable me to retain focus on the social, the historical and the cultural, whilst (seemingly) concentrating more exclusively on specific, highly delineated activities and interactions that take place within ‘natural’ settings.

Sociocultural and co-constructionist approaches have developed out of earlier Vygotskian-inspired western theorising (e.g. McNaughton, 1995, Rogoff, 1990; Valsiner, 1988, Wertsch, 1991). Stuart McNaughton (1996b; 191) describes a basic principle of sociocultural approaches as that;

[d]evelopment arises from socially provided platforms for learning and personal transformations. In this process the learner (child) is active, in the strong sense of reconstructing and transforming from both interpsychological and intrapsychological action.

However, resulting shifts in general or conventional western developmental thinking have not necessarily been to any great extent transformative (except in the transformation of Vygotskian ideas). Rather, in essence what has occurred is an assimilation of the ‘useful concepts’ into existing western psychological paradigms, a “political, social and historical filtering” (Daniels, 1996; 3) of Vygotskian, and other non-western psychological thought.

Simply moving from a focus on the individual to a focus on the group is not seen as the solution for criticisms rehearsed in the previous section of this chapter. In relation to attempts to use Vygotskian theory to address the individual-society relationship,
...much of the work in the West has tended to ignore the social beyond the interactional and to celebrate the individual and mediational processes at the expense of a consideration of socio-institutional, cultural and historical factors.

(Daniels, 1996; 9)

Russian-originated sociohistorical theory has generally been inserted into western psychological theory in co-optive rather than creative ways. However, initial perceptions that Vygotskian ways of thinking about development and learning have ‘Māori-useful’ potential, still remain. One challenge is to examine the possibility of re-inserting or emphasising the ‘political’ ethos, and the arguably ‘spiritual’ aura that imbued Vygotsky’s original work.

Of concern has been the identification and development of a theoretical praxis that enables the comprehension of the activity of people (including myself) who are involved in “changing circumstances which are changing them” (Newman & Holzman, 1993). As noted earlier, Graham Smith (1997) provides an in-depth analysis of theory-praxis relationships in his explication of Māori struggling to transform the institution of ‘education’. This in turn potentially contributes to a transformation of what it means to be Māori as we move into the twenty-first century and beyond. Parallels can be drawn with Vygotsky’s psychological approach of ‘tool and result’. That is, the emphasis placed on the dialectical relationships of society and history and individuals and the insistence that understanding individual psychologies involves understanding that individuals all live in, are created through and in turn create history and society.

This thesis not only takes a sociocultural gaze in terms of keeping a range of people, contexts and history in focus, but also in terms of ‘what is’ and ‘what might be’. The ‘is’ are lived everyday realities. The ‘might be’ are what we might become, both what is desired and what is dreaded. Overlaying this are the moves being taken to bring about change, to re-transform what it means to be Māori, as well as the society Māori inhabit.

Cole (1995b; 193) identifies the need to recognise ‘history’ as an additional active partner in interactions in the co-construction process; “the cultural past reified in the cultural present in the forms of the artifacts that mediate the process of coconstruction”. While Vygotsky did incorporate ‘history’ into the developmental equation, his conceptualisation
of history has been considered problematic. Vygotsky’s recognition of history as change is interrelated with that of history as ‘universal progress’, which contains troublesome echoes of Darwinism (Shweder, 1991). This has resulted in a reluctance on the part of some neo-Vygotskian developmental psychologists to use ‘sociohistorical’ because of its deterministic and evolutionist overtones and to substitute it with ‘sociocultural’ (Wertsch, del Rio, & Alvarez, 1995). Labelling Vygotskian inspired approaches to development and learning as ‘sociocultural’ causes some personal inner turbulence. For me, a sense of the importance of history to development and learning comes through in the term ‘sociohistorical’, that on the surface appears lacking in the term ‘sociocultural’ (see also Cole, 1995b).

However, how is history understood from a socio-cultural-historical position? Some would argue that culture is history, therefore the generally preferred terminology adequately captures the importance of history in learning and development. Wertsch, del Rio & Alvarez (1995) identify the goal of a sociocultural approach as the explication of relationships between human mental action and the cultural, institutional and historical situations in which this action occurs. Taking cognisance of these views, I have been using the term ‘sociocultural’ to identify the developmental psychology perspectives that are being drawn on in the course of this thesis.

To backtrack somewhat, an essential (and very attractive) element of Vygotsky’s theory of development and learning is the assumption that human developmental processes derive from, and can only be understood through examination of social and cultural processes. That is, development and learning appear firstly in processes occurring between individuals and then in processes occurring within individuals.

Individuals are made up of and are what make up culture, society, history. For some people, though probably fewer and fewer world-wide, what counts as ‘culture’ and ‘society’ is inextricably overlapping. For those of us who grow, learn and develop in multicultural societies and in societies with histories of colonisation, the relationship between culture and society is often very complex. My approach to understanding and engaging with individual learning and development is one of understanding and engaging
with developing individuals-in-culture-society-history. Given this approach, how do I go about the task?

**Human activity - human action?**

In contemporary developmental psychology neo-Vygotskian perspectives have provided some of the critiques of how traditional psychology abstracts individuals from their social and historical contexts and attempts to understand and describe them as behavioural units. One of the key contributions of sociocultural perspectives to developmental research is that it has effected a shift from focusing on the ‘individual’ as the unit of study and analysis to instances of human ‘action’ and ‘activity’ although, as it has already been stated, this is not considered to be without its own accompanying weaknesses.

What is the most valid focus of developmental study, action or activity? Some socioculturalists argue that the proper focus is human action, (e.g. Wertsch, 1995) whilst others posit activity as the unit of analysis (e.g. Rogoff, 1995). How are these concepts of action and activity different?

According to Rogoff (1995; 140) the;

> ...use of “activity” or “event” as the unit of analysis - with active and dynamic contributions from individuals, their social partners, and historical traditions and materials and their transformations - allows a reformulation of the relation between the individual and the social and cultural environments in which each is inherently involved in the others’ definition. None exists separately.

Wertsch proposes that;

> ...mental functioning and sociocultural setting be understood as dialectically interacting moments, or aspects of a more inclusive unit of analysis - *human action*. As understood here, action is not carried out either by the individual or by society, although there are individual and societal moments to any action. For related reasons an account of action cannot be derived from the study of mental functioning or sociocultural setting in isolation. Instead, action provides a context within which the individual and society (as well as mental functioning and sociocultural context) are understood as interrelated moments. (1995; 60)
I am not sure whether the distinctions as articulated above are more than whether a word ends with n or y!

For my Masters thesis I drew on Leont'ev’s theory of activity to argue that analyses of any processes of development needed to be located at the level of actions occurring in social (read human) activity. My understanding and use of Leont’ev’s theory was to a large extent based on my understanding of Courtney Cazden’s (1988b) description. Briefly, I understood that according to Leont’ev, human activity exists as the largest unit in which most social interactions are imbedded. Human activities are distinguished by motives. Actions, of which activities are partially composed, are distinguished by specific goals and composed of operations. Nothing, activity, action or operation has a one-to-one correspondence to anything else. Operations may occur and result in any number of actions, each distinguished by a specific goal. A number of actions may be involved in an activity, or a specific action may be involved in several activities. The units of analyses I used spanned the lot, activities, actions and operations! How I attempted to hold it all together, was by locating activity motives and action goals within a cultural framework. That is, I tried to understand the socialisation properties of activities, actions and operations in relation to ‘motives’ and ‘goals’ of socialising young children into Māori culturally preferred ways of thinking and behaving and engaging with te reo Māori in a kōhanga reo setting.

There has been a call to go beyond Leont’ev’s notion of action as the unit of analysis. Limitations identified in Leont’ev’s ‘action’ include the emphasis on (often singular) goals, and the glossing over of disharmony and conflict. Smolka, De Goes, & Pino (1995) make the insightful observation that often underlying sociocultural studies is an assumption that some form of teleological action is at issue. While learners may be conceived as active, while settings for learning and teaching may be perceived as socioculturally constructed, while potentially there are any number of appropriate pathways for learning and development, there is generally assumed to be a single most desired or effective outcome, a specific goal to which action is directed. That is, there is the danger of making simplistic interpretations of goals from the actions (and vice versa). The teleological nature of activity theory, its emphasis on the goal-directed nature of human action ignores the fact that while purposeful, such action may involve multiple,
shared and unshared, goals. And the complexity is such that goals may be redefined in the course of an activity and over time. Human interaction, in which action may be situated, is often asymmetrical, disharmonious, involving intersubjective and dialectical tensions (the significance of ‘subjectivities’ is explored in the following section).

Approaching ‘action’ and ‘activity’ from another angle provides a further dimension to what Smolka et al (1995) appear to be arguing. Linda Smith (L. Mead, 1996) describes how tensions around ‘motive’ and ‘goal’ are played out within Kura Kaupapa Māori. Māori parents, children, teachers, kaumatua, whānau and the many others who constitute Kura Kaupapa Māori as a movement do not make up one homogenous, like-thinking whole. Even when one focuses on parents within one kura, as a group they differ across dimensions too numerous to list here. These differences impinge on the wide ranging and sometimes-disparate goals they hold for the shared, purposeful action of ‘sending their children to Kura Kaupapa Māori’.

Analysis of observational data in Part Two is at the level of social interaction between participants. These co-participants within the specified activity of bookreading can be identified in a myriad of ways, such as various combinations of parents and children, bilingual and second language learners or as ‘expert’ and ‘novice’ readers. Theoretical focus on social interaction often reflects notions of ‘harmonious, symmetrical’ intersubjectivity (‘intersubjectivity’ is considered further in the following section). In reality this is not characteristic of many settings. I can honestly say that some interactions between parents and children captured on tape bear witness to this! However disharmony and conflicting subjectivities need not be viewed as failure. What is required is an expansion of the basic notion of action beyond the teleological.

Another criticism levelled at Leont’ev’s psychological theory of activity is the absence of recognition of any spiritual dimensions resulting in the spiritual worlds of humans being ignored or oversimplified. The corresponding reduction to object-oriented activity results in a mechanistic treatment involving little or no regard to this dimension of human activity (Zinchenko, 1995; 43).
This criticism is also true of contemporary Vygotskian and neo-Vygotskian approaches. To what extent ‘cultural-historical’ psychology may have had potential for taking cognisance of spiritual dimensions in the study of development can only be guessed at.

Gustav Shpet, Aleksei Losev, Mikhail Bakhtin, Pavel Florenkii, and the major founder of cultural-historical psychology, Lev Vygotsky, were simultaneously scholars and connoisseurs of these spheres [science, art, aesthetics, philosophy, theology] of human activity. The ideas of Vladimir Solov’ev about the “unity in all: of rational and spiritual knowledge were still alive…

During the development of cultural-historical psychology, there were not only additions, but losses, or simplifications, in the original corpus of ideas. The spiritual component of the “unity in all” was lost, which amounted to its destruction.

(Zinchenko, 1995:37)

Earlier I described how the perceived ‘spiritlessness’ of developmental psychology was often criticised by Māori students and educators. Philosophical discussions of Māori learning and development centralise ‘wairua’, the spiritual dimension. A fundamental assumption of Māori world views is that there is an elemental spirituality in all human activity (see e.g. Nepe, 1991; Pere, 1994; 1997). Inevitably, Māori approaches to psychological development and learning must incorporate recognition and consideration of this dimension in efforts to realise Māori development and wellbeing.

Tool time

In Chapter Four literacy is described as being among other things, a tool that may be used properly or improperly. The importance of ‘tool’ in Vygotsky’s accounts of learning and development, particularly in notions of mediation and mediated action, have come to take a central place in sociocultural approaches to research. Cultural tools such as literacy are viewed as playing an essential role in shaping activity, but are not necessarily considered the determinants or causes.

While some argue that cultural tools have their impact only in the results achieved when individuals use them, Newman and Holzman (1993) argue that in being used cultural tools are being made. In effect, they are saying that the Vygotskian notion of ‘tool and result’ has often been misinterpreted as ‘tool for result’. Focusing on a cultural tool in
itself will tell us little about how it will be utilised in human activity (Wertsch del Rio & Alvarez, 1995:22). Mediation is viewed as a process involving the potential of cultural tools to shape action as well as a process involving action shaping the unique use of these tools.

Another aspect of cultural tools, which is particularly significant in terms of this thesis, relates to claims made about the nature of new or newly introduced tools. “Even if a new cultural tool frees us from some earlier limitation of perspective, it introduces new ones of its own.” (Wertsch et al, 1995; 24). The introduction and accommodation of print literacy by Māori society as a new cultural tool had the potential to increase the means and contexts for using, expressing and recording Māori language. However up until recently it has in reality played a key role in achieving the opposite; in decreasing and narrowing the channels for Māori language use.

Many cultural tools that mediate human action did not evolve for the purposes to which they have come to be used. In many cases cultural tools we use are ‘borrowed’ from quite distinct contexts. There are ramifications of such borrowing. For instance there are consequences of applying a script developed for one language to another (Olson & Torrance, 1991; Olson, 1995). There are historically located implications of using print as a vehicle for te reo Māori. The introduction of western forms of print literacy into Māori society, in which cultural tools for literate purposes included oracy and various art forms, was accompanied by genres in western texts that differed from Māori genres.

In a similar sense, one could argue that kōhanga reo and kura kaupapa Māori are co-options of non-Māori forms of schooling. An implication of their co-option is that in order to function, there has been a corresponding need to co-opt the literacies that have traditionally accompanied these forms of schooling.

There are present-day implications in using the cultural tool of print literacy for developing individual oral competencies in te reo Māori. Generally, printed language differs from spoken language. It can be argued that the balance between print-based and oral-based language learning experiences can influence the kinds of language forms spoken. The language of second language speakers who have had predominantly formal,
text-based learning can sometimes end up sounding artificial and inauthentic, unlike that of a native speaker in a natural situation (Lindfors, 1987). I have heard disparaging comments being made about Māori second language speakers such as “he learned his Māori from a book”. Personally, I do not think remarks such as these are helpful, either to the person, or to the ‘cause’. I also believe that Māori, like any other modern-day language (by modern-day I mean a language being spoken today) has the right to be a language of print and I have argued the relationship between language regeneration and print in Chapter Three. Furthermore, if we have goals for our children to speak and be literate in te reo Māori, evidenced in our sending them to kura kaupapa Māori to learn the “three Rs” through Māori, we can work to achieve this by showing ourselves to our children also as speakers, readers and writers of te reo Māori.

Wertsch et al (1995) contends that the pronounced nature of the theme of mediation as understood by Vygotsky;

reflects the pervasive assumption that mediational means, or cultural tools (terms we shall use interchangeably), must play an essential role in the basic formulation of sociocultural research. In particular they provide the link or bridge between the concrete actions carried out by individuals and groups, on the one hand, and cultural, institutional, and historical settings, on the other. (1995; 21)

Such understandings of ‘mediation’ still contain echoes of dualism, of a kind that were key concerns initiating some of the critique psychology has faced. That is, reflected is the view that there is a division between human beings and societal settings, albeit one that can be mediated through the use of cultural tools.

The analysis of cultural tools itself is a mediator in the sociocultural theoretical framework, in that it makes the re-connection of some areas of human sciences possible. Wertsch (1991) claims that change ensuing from the adoption of a Vygotskian framework requires support of concepts from other social sciences, for example, Bourdieu’s sociological ‘cultural capital’. In examining the regression (repression) and resurgence of te reo Māori amongst Māori, and its intersections with print literacy, I have travelled many theoretical landscapes. Suffice to say, it has been a struggle to understand writings
from less familiar fields and disciplines, and in trying to make meaning, I feel in danger of arriving at interpretations other than those the authors are intent in making.

The zone of proximal development

One of the conceptual constructs developed by Vygotsky, and processed into a key psychological and methodological tool by western neo-Vygotskians, is the ‘zone of proximal development’ (zpd), described by Vygotsky (1978; 86) as;

... the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers.

Generally, emphasis has been placed on examining the instructional implications of the zpd (e.g. Clay & Cazden; 1990; Searle, 1984, see also Moll, 1990), although its potential for assessment has also been explored (e.g. Ministry of Education, 1997b).

Recent reinterpretations and extensions of Vygotsky’s theories and conceptual constructs have not gone un-criticised. Marxist and critical psychologists argue that Vygotsky’s ideas and notions have undergone sanitisation by mainly western, North American researchers and theorists. Newman and Holzman assert that the significance of the zpd is that it is not premised on the individual - society separation, rather it is an historical unity. Too often they see the ‘zone’ being “wrenched out of life, out of history, out of material reality, out of the social process that produces it.” (1993; 79).

Mariane Hedegaard argues that the zpd is clearly more than a psychological construct or abstraction, it is socially-culturally-politically determined. She makes strong claims about the relationship of zpd to the values, beliefs and practices of society.

The ZPD is a very valuable tool. It implies that we have to have some values and an idea of what a good life is if we are to educate children....if you read Vygotsky carefully, you see that the ZPD is not just a general psychological law. The next ‘zone’ for the child is determined by the society in which we are living, the values and customs for the upbringing of youth...

(Hedegaard, in Holzman, 1990:16)
One of the dilemmas I have had revolves around what is valued (discussed more fully in Chapter Seven). Choosing, for example to focus on particular literacy activities and choosing to highlight particular actions within these, involves value judgements about print and about ways of engaging with print.

A number of researchers have extended the focus on zpd from its relationship with how individuals learn, to zpd as a fundamental social, cultural and historical characteristic. The zone can be implicated in reorganising learning contexts, relationships and interactions within these contexts. Manipulating zones goes beyond simply the recreation of an individual’s zpd. It can include creating reciprocal and group zpds. In studies in this thesis, zpds for second language learning kura parents are explored in the context of bookreading with new entrant kura kaupapa Māori children.

In my work with parents I wanted to develop, as Moll and Greenberg (1990) so aptly state it, an appreciation of the knowledge of parents by the parents themselves (see also Newman & Holzman, 1993; 80-81). Parent-children interaction around Māori language story books was identified as a potential site for this development. Using Māori text as a prop, parents could interact as Māori language speakers “as a precondition for this new structure of activity to appear as an individual psychological function” (Cole, 1995a; 44). I wanted parents to become consciously aware of their growing knowledge and expertise in particular ways of talking in te reo Māori during bookreading interactions, and of how this growing knowledge and expertise can be utilised to support their own learning and development as well as their children’s.

McLane (1990; 317) states that one must consider “how to negotiate zones of proximal development with the children and the adults who work with them”. What I wanted to do was use books to negotiate and set up zpds so that parents perform as speakers (and less explicitly) so that children perform as (particular kinds of) readers. I wanted to self-consciously draw on or create life environments, not experimental situations (Newman & Holzman, 1993; 119).

Wood, Bruner and Ross (1976) were arguably the first to operationalise what essentially existed as a conceptual construct, the zpd, in a seminal piece of research looking at the
ways maternal tutoring behaviour created a support system for child problem-solving. They used the metaphor of a scaffold to describe how adult assistance helped to support and construct children’s learning in the social interactions occurring. The notion of scaffolding is also drawn on in the following studies, primarily in relation to how the activity of bookreading with children and the interactions that ensue may provide a scaffold for parents’ second language learning. While children need not be acting as tutors in a formal or conscious sense, aspects of their language actions with their parents during bookreading are identified as having tutorial properties.

There is greater acknowledgement of the sociocultural nature of development in more Vygotskian approaches of psychology. However a sense of how society and culture influence the ‘natural, normal course of development and learning is often still reflected. Even from a position that views society and culture as inseparable from development and learning, there is still a measure of comparison made of various cultural groups with white, middle-class culture. A sense of psychological orientation being, as Sinha (1984; 21) described it, “basically micro-social, concentrating itself almost entirely on personal characteristics of the individual actors in social processes rather than on socio-structural factors” still remains.

Before describing and discussing the studies in more depth, one more approach to psychology is to be considered. This approach is attempting to include not only individual and social, but also societal-political processes and forces within the psychological focus.

CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

‘Critical psychology’ as a generic label for developments occurring across a range of psychological fields, has emerged out of internal disenchantment and external criticism of psychology, some of which has been outlined and discussed above. Many contemporary theoretical movements, such as anti-colonialism, feminism and post-modernism have influenced the development of critical psychology. Critical psychology approaches in the field conventionally known as developmental psychology, as well as critical approaches
being used in other disciplines to address issues of colonisation and de-colonisation, are uncovering theoretical and conceptual ways of working which are potentially very useful in Māori approaches to studying and understanding development.

**Fundamental elements of ‘Critical Psychology’**

A fundamental concern shared by ‘critical psychologists’ working across the range of psychological areas is the evaluation of “theories and practices of psychology in terms of how they maintain an unjust and unsatisfying status quo.” (Prilleltensky & Fox, 1997;3). Critical psychology generally draws on ‘critical theory’ that has its roots in the Frankfurt school and shares common elements underlying ‘critical theory’ approaches. These elements reflect emancipatory agendas, commitment to change and desire to address injustices and inequalities (Gibson, 1986). Critical theory approaches have also contributed significantly to kaupapa Māori theory.

Prilleltensky and Fox (1997) describe values that critical psychologists generally identify as of key importance. These include; social justice, self-determination and participation, human wellbeing and diversity. They also outline a number of central concerns that critical psychology aims to address, including;

1) conventional psychology’s pre-occupation with individualism;
2) psychology’s role in the identification and privileging of values and norms of the ‘powerful’, and ‘dominant’ groups;
3) power disparities and our own roles as ‘psychologists’ in oppression.

A requisite for critical psychological research or applied practice is an explicit recognition of ‘subjectivity’. That is, the practice of critical psychology involves identification of the subjective nature of one’s efforts. Working as a critical psychologist requires acknowledging the degree to which moral values, political allegiances, and personal and professional experience affect choices made and positions taken. This extends to ensuring work one engages in should be morally defensible (Prilleltensky & Fox, 1997). Two forms of subjectivity that feature across critical psychological literature are intersubjectivity and metasubjectivity.
Subjectivity, intersubjectivity, metasubjectivity

From a critical psychological view ‘subjectivity’ and ‘intersubjectivity’ have significance as psychological terms that extend way beyond notions around the perceiving self and around psychological interaction. Black England-based academic Amina Mama (1995; 1) describes her use of the concept of subjectivity “instead of the psychological terms ‘identity’ and ‘self’” to indicate her rejection “of the dualistic notion of psychological and social spheres as essentially separate territories: one internal and one external to the person.”.

‘Subjectivity’ has been used to look at how relative positions of power and powerlessness that a group may hold within society affects the way individuals perceive their personal societal positions. In this sense, there is overlap with more sociological approaches in ‘critical theory’ (Gibson, 1986; Giroux, 1983). This is unsurprising, given the previously mentioned over-lapping genealogy of German critical psychology and critical theory - their shared geographical, intellectual and cultural origins. I think the relevance of subjectivity as conceptualised in terms of power is in its potential usefulness for trying to understand the wide variations in responses of indigenous, colonised peoples to the positioning of their cultures in contemporary societies. This is illustrated for example in varied reactions to indigenous-driven interventions, including the range of Māori responses to the emergence of kura kaupapa Māori.

Two kinds of thinking, interpretive and comprehensive, are described in German critical psychology (Tolman, 1994). The conceptualisations of these two kinds of thinking, interpretive and comprehensive, complement aspects of Freirian theorising, encapsulated in the notion of domestication (people working within relatively powerless, oppressed conditions) and conscientisation (coming to recognise that one is oppressed and working towards liberating action). The first kind of thinking, characterised as perceiving the way the world is as the way it should be, can be compared to hegemonic thought. When one is relatively powerless or holds a subordinate position in society, the contradictions between one’s own and dominant interests are sometimes handled through treating any ensuing problems as personal and through repression. Problems identified with this mode of thinking are that it fails to grasp the historical and societal connectedness of the whole,
therefore lacking a sense of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. It results in static as opposed to developmental thinking. The future is seen as a simple continuation of the present. In contrast, comprehensive thinking is associated with extending possibilities for action, fitting in with notions of creative and constructive action.

These kinds of thinking are not seen as characterising particular people so much as particular thought-action patterns. Comprehensive and interpretive thinking are not mutually exclusive or unidirectional, indeed comprehensive cognition can develop out of interpretive thinking, interpretive thinking can incorporate comprehensive thinking.

Subjectivities and language development
As discussed in the section above, more noticeable recent changes in developmental psychology have been around its attempts to acknowledge and understand the social underpinnings of development and learning. However, German theorist Holzkamp (in Tolman, 1994) believes that criticisms of ‘bourgeois’ psychology for its reduction of social processes to social interaction are still pertinent.

In psychological study of language development the role of social interaction, particularly dyadic forms of interaction involving mother and child, moved into centre stage especially during the 1970s and 1980s (Gleason, 1988). ‘Social’ is seen to refer to social existence in the broadest sense of the word, including reference to animal social relations, which largely arise out of the biologies of particular species. While biology plays a role in the social interaction of human beings, the way we act and the activities we carry out are much more strongly guided by cultural information. Cultural rather than biological information is of key importance to humans for our survival. Our organised societal groups carry our cultural knowledge, this is what makes us different from other Earth-bound species. Holzkamp (in Tolman, 1994; 38) argues that the distinction between social and societal are essential because,

what is distinctly human about psychological processes, most especially subjectivity, is precisely that they are societal, not merely social. The problem of subjective interests does not arise with rats or even with subhuman primates in the way that it does for humans,...subjective interests are concerns that belong to societal and historical existence; subjectivity represents a category that is simultaneously scientific and political.
‘Cartesian’ thinking, as a mode seen as characterising western thought, holds that objects are defined exclusively in and of themselves. That is, all things exist independently of other things, separately, in the case of apparent opposites. Where entities are viewed as entirely separated, their relationships to each other can then be conceptualised as being causal, they have causal effects one upon the other (Tolman, 1994; 135). Rather than the ‘individual’ and ‘society’ being in some sort of Cartesian relationship, one can only exist as a human individual and attain significance as an individual within the societal relations one has with others. It is only through our socialisation, or our societalisation, that we become important as an individual to the survival of our culture and our society. Societal relations are vital to each of us as individuals in that they are pre-existing and co-existing conditions under which our personal existence and daily life must be secured. These relations are also what the individual must support and produce and reproduce, by taking part in the productive activities related to societal existence. What theory and method needs to enable us to do then, is to understand and articulate the ‘societally mediated character’ of psychological categories, including categories of development (Tolman, 1994; 94).

For each of us as individuals, societal relations also include relating to others interpersonally, intentionally and reciprocally. The reciprocal nature of societal relations involves us relating to others from our particular subjective points of view and the movement from “a state of mere co-operation to that of a shared subjectivity” (Tolman, 1994; 103).

The notion of ‘shared subjectivity’ is a critical feature of developmental literature on language development and use. Termed intersubjectivity, it has been described by Wells (1986; 35) as “the essential foundation of any communication”. It features strongly in the study of infant communication (Trevarthen, 1993) and how language development in the very young is fostered and supported. For Wells, intersubjectivity mediates aspects of the parent-child relationship, initially through mechanisms of mutual and reciprocal attention, then extending to include the wider social and physical world through mechanisms of joint attention. That is, intersubjectivity is viewed as psychological interaction between selves, one individual self to another individual self. In this sense intersubjectivity links into the process of scaffolding, in that it too is viewed as involving joint attention around
goal-directed tasks or activities (McNaughton, 1995). Trevarthen describes intersubjectivity as not being the exclusive preserve of human social processes, that it is part of a shared evolutionary history across animal species.

However intersubjectivity human-style has value-added capacity in comparison with that of (other) animals. This value-added capacity is in the ability of human beings for;

direct interaction with one another’s motives, emotions, and perceptual processes, and this serves in effective and sustained cooperative action. Human power for specifying, learning, and recording cultural (social, environmental, technical, and scientific) knowledge about nonpresent objects and events are unique, and human intersubjectivity has certain extra specializations for mutual regulation of motive states and joint action in the shared world. It has, moreover, an exceptional referential and narrative productivity, for being about something.

(Trevarthen, 1993: 128-9)

Intersubjectivity is seen as located within culture and cultural meanings, and that feedback parents provide their young children helps them to behave in ways that are culturally acceptable and meaningful. For language this means that one of the major tasks facing language learners is to figure out not only the language spoken in their community or society but also acceptable ways to use that language. Though there has been much empirical and theoretical focus on the significance of social relations and social interaction in language development, the socialisation of language has only recently become a systematic focus of contemporary developmental concern and study. What it means to become a speaker of a language as part of a particular culture or society and what it means to a language and culture to have speakers, has tended to be studied in disciplines other than developmental psychology (Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986).

*Ko te reo te mauri o te mana Māori*  
*The language is the life principle of Māori mana*

Learning language, particularly a second language, involves both subjective and intersubjective shifts. It involves not only psychological interaction processes between self and others and within oneself, in a Vygotskian sense of shifting learning from the social to the internal. It also involves processes of shifting perceptions of one’s language
competencies, at the simplest level, from non-speaker to speaker. In this sense, intersubjectivity not only involves "psychological interaction of one individual self to another individual self", but 'intrapsychological' interaction with oneself. The complexity of the task increases when a second language is one's native language. For multi-faceted and historically located reasons, one may already 'know' in a non-linguistic sense, for example in relation to cultural knowledge carried by that language.

Strictly speaking, the world in which human beings live is a societal world. Hardly ever (if at all) are we confronted by a purely natural world and expected to deal with it on the basis only of information contained in our genetic material. Our relations to the world, both societal and natural, are mediated by our relations to others, whether this is an actual person, an artifact made by other persons, or by language learned from others together with the meaning system carried by that language, that is, knowledge.

(Tolman, 1994; 94)

At the close of the twentieth century, Māori parents' subjectively held goals and visions influence their choosing whether or not to raise Māori speaking children. The view that Māori language survival is critical for Māori cultural survival has been stated and restated, and arguably influences parents' choices. What is of critical interest in this thesis is the development of other dimensions of the culture-language relationship. This includes Māori language as a critical component of Māori personal existence and daily life, and Māori as individual learners and speakers of te reo Māori as critically important to the cultural viability of te reo Māori. Supporting these dimensions involves supporting parents' perceptions of themselves as Māori language speakers in their relations with others, particularly their children.

**Metasubjectivity**

The notion of metasubjectivity in critical psychological methodology (e.g. Mama, 1995) overlaps with discussions and approaches to Kaupapa Māori research in the field of Māori education (e.g. Bishop, 1996; L. Mead, 1996; L. Smith, 1991). In summary, these relate to questions about relationships between the 'researcher', the 'researched' and the research itself. These relate to issues about who defines, designs and controls research. In critical psychological research, shared metasubjectivity between the 'researcher' and 'researched' is a necessary element.
Metasubjectivity has implications for generalisation. Rather than generalisation being seen as a closed system of concrete-abstract, generalisation is located within knowledge sharing between research participants. It is premised on the assumption that results will not be simply developing knowledge about the researched for general(ised) dissemination and discussion, but will develop knowledge for the researched. Generalisation occurs when communication between ‘researchers’ and ‘researched’ is made possible through the researched appropriating necessary theoretical structure. This also entails that any ‘problem’ being investigated needs to be a problem for the researched, not about the researched. This doesn’t necessarily mean that the researched explicitly identify the research problem, but that they too understand it as a problem, and that in understanding the problem, working to identify solutions is in their interests.

From this position, any form of deception is not considered an appropriate characteristic of research that involves ‘subjects’ as co-investigators, although of course there is still the possibility of co-investigators deceiving the primary researchers! However in this kind of research, ‘subjects’ have a vital and personal interest in learning about problems or issues of interest. Part of the research task involves working to increase knowledge and understandings of ‘subjects’ about a particular issue or problem. It also involves working to increase the likelihood of productive actions and change, thus the incentives for deception are minimised.

It has been observed that in conventional or mainstream psychology attempts to intervene in social inequities and injustices, energy tends to be focused on trying to ‘fix’ individual problems, rather than on tackling structural, institutional and societal ones (e.g. Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997). Psychological endeavour aimed at making change often involves supporting minor reforms, rather than radical change. As an alternative across the range of psychological fields, ‘critical psychology’ approaches are not easy approaches, given the fundamental mission to facilitate change; not only in the field of psychology but also in society.

Existing tools of mainstream or conventional psychology can be used in attempting to develop a Māori approach to developmental psychology. Theory, methods and analyses can be used. But the research and theoretical ‘culture’ into which they are co-opted is
arguably different. Likewise, the purposes to which they are put are located in subjective and intersubjective Māori envisioning of alternative futures, in the process of being realised. According to Tolman (1994; 144) psychology needs to be about producing;

the kind of knowledge that individual human beings need in order to expand their real possibilities for meaningful participation in the collective regulation of the conditions covering their own lives. Only in this way can psychology become genuinely critical.

SUMMARY

This chapter began with the purpose of presenting a framework that theoretically validates indigenous cultural epistemologies, that accommodates indigenous movements towards self-determination and that incorporates methodological tools for examining social interaction. That Kaupapa Māori theory imbues the framework should be read as a given.

Themes discussed in this chapter include indigenisation of psychology and critiques focusing on the absence of ‘power’ and ‘society’ in conventional approaches to psychology. Sociocultural perspectives on development, particularly in relation to their incorporation of culture into psychology at a fundamental level, are presented and concepts and models that are utilised in the analyses of whānau bookreadings are highlighted. Critical psychological approaches are discussed in terms of their mission of meaningful intervention and change at the level of societal injustices. The significance given to as a psychological concept ‘subjectivity’ is in cognisance of its usefulness for making sense of personal positions inhabited at the societal level. Its usefulness extends to helping to understand of Māori language-related decisions of parents for their children and for themselves.

In the process of developing a framework, I have raised questions about the efficacy and desirability of working within developmental psychology albeit from a Māori perspective. Given in essence that is what I strive to do, the task becomes one of trying to articulate a more authentic and appropriate approach for Māori.
A Māori approach to psychological development and learning being proposed in this thesis involves at least the following:

(i) identifying, critically examining and validating Māori knowledge and conceptualisations of development and learning;
(ii) describing and explaining Māori development, learning and behaviour in ways that legitimate and ‘normalise’ Māori;
(iii) optimising development and learning in areas that Māori identify as critical or essential;
(iv) challenging the position of Māori in society and attempting to make change;
(v) a kaupapa Māori theoretical framework to guide and interrogate research processes and methods.

It necessitates developing a notion of psychology as a tool, not a tool for psychology’s sake, but rather for use in efforts to facilitate the achievement of Māori visions and directions.