CHAPTER TWO

THE PAKEHA PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

The initial kaupapa of this thesis is that Western modes of Theory construct us as Subjects. Further, I make the contention that Maori have been constructed as the Other. The dual notions of Self/Same and Other have to be elaborated upon in the additional context of Subject and Object construction. The French writer, Michel Foucault has written extensively of ‘Subjects’ being constructed and constituted by the Self. This chapter elaborates on the construction of Pakeha as Subjects within Western-European philosophical paradigms.

To recapitulate; the two dualisms I am confronting are the notions of Self and Other and the notions of Subject and Object. These dualisms are posited in a variety of discourses in modern philosophy and in classic philosophy. The purpose of this chapter is to converge these classic and modern dualisms into a Postmodern discussion on Pakeha identity.

Maori have been positioned at the interface of both of these apexes; as the Other and as the Object. Maori have been caught in the theoretical cross-fire, and that theoretical battleground is constantly being shifted from beneath them.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF PAKEHA IDENTITY

So why do I want to discuss the construction of Pakeha identity? Essential to my identity is the forgiving of myself for being Pakeha. Because I am of Pakeha heritage, my life and my thought has very much been influenced and moulded by Pakeha views of the world. I am the living embodiment of the highly problematic term 'biculturalism' in that my blood is Maori and Pakeha. I ask the questions:

Why has the Pakeha identity assumed the Master role in Aotearoa?
How have Pakeha been constructed so that they can posit Maori as the Other, as the Slave?

Many writers, Pakeha and Maori, have remarked that Maori are the most well-studied and documented group in the Pacific. Patu Hohepa, a prominent Maori academic points out - "Not that this is a good thing, for the publications rarely articulate Maori aspirations but instead regard the Maori as a good scientific specimen. Lately the worm has turned and is asking that the Pakeha be subjected to the same scrutiny and documentation". (P.Hohepa 1978:99). Hohepa's remarks are pertinent to Kaupapa Maori Theory. I am informed also by Cixous's writing:

A commonplace gesture of History: there have to be two races - the masters and the slaves.

I ask the question - Why does there have to be some 'other' - nc master without a slave?

If I put the question to the average 'normal' Pakeha in Aotearoa - would they accept that he/she had been constructed by theory and language? As a person of both races I ask the question - Why is there so much racism in this country and from whence did it originate? Why did my taha Maori end up being a Pakeha privilege?
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN - PAKEHA IDENTITY

I use the word European before Pakeha because it situates the Pakeha identity historically, philosophically, psychologically and geographically in the Western-European context rather than being constructed within only the geographical reality of Aotearoa. My purpose is to challenge the assumption of many Pakeha that they have been removed from their historical, cultural, and colonial roots, whilst at the same time they deny their dependence on Maori identity as a referent for their own identity.

In the last decade various writings on the topic of Pakeha identity have become highly contentious. In this chapter I challenge some of these opinions. Michael King’s notion of a ‘second indigenous New Zealand culture’ is one which I find problematic. This Pakeha writer comments:

If one recognizes the existence of the evolving Pakeha culture of which I speak, and if one accepts that it is a phenomenon that could only accrete in New Zealand from the Maori, European and wider human ingredients that History has cast up on these shores - than what we are acknowledging here is not something foreign: it is a second indigenous\textsuperscript{12} New Zealand culture. (M.King 1991:19)

This is what Pakeha culture is for King and in his opinion a growing number of New Zealanders think this way. I make the point that from a Kaupapa Maori perspective, King’s notion of Pakeha identity IS something foreign and it is epitomised in the Maori word - \textit{tauwhi}.

King’s claim that Pakeha culture is a ‘second indigenous culture’ takes the potential power of Maori critique, out of Maori hands. As Tangata Whenua, as the indigenous people of this land, our status is belittled by his co-opting of the term.

King goes on to add that this second indigenous culture is as important as Maoritanga - it is "being fed and will be fed as much by its own memories and
traditions as Maoritanga is by its past". (King 1991:20). From my perspective, Pakeha culture has grown obese by its own memories and tradition.

In the conclusion of Cherryl Smith's thesis (1994) titled *Kimihia Te Maramatanga Colonisation and Iwi Development*, she makes the point:

Another area that is largely invisible in this [her] thesis is the construction of white identities through encounters with and in relationship to indigenous peoples. Ashis Nandy describes colonisation as a shared culture. The construction of Pakeha identity has had to be done in relationship to Maori but this has not been made explicit. Edward Said says that identity is formed out of what we are not. This would suggest that the construction of Pakeha as hard working, superior whiteness must have been juxtaposed against ideas of lazy inferior brownness. This shared culture of colonization, as it creates the identity of Pakeha, has yet to be examined. There is a deafening silence in this area.


My discussion or exposition of the construction of Pakeha identity is in part to pick up the take (challenge) laid down by this Maori writer. It proposes a shattering of the silence. In 1978 Patu Hohepa challenged us to remember the retort of Nga Tamatoa - "There is no Maori problem, what we have is a problem with Pakeha". He goes on to add:

The greatest difficulty is that no one has any idea of what Pakeha society is or how it ticks. In the search for equality Maori leaders are asking that the cultural ethos of the Pakeha be not taken for granted and that it be studied in the same way Maori society has been dissected.


The most provocative Maori pronouncement concerning Pakeha identity has come from Donna Awatere. In her text *Maori Sovereignty*, she wrote:
The fact is that in this country white people have no real identity of their own apart from that which exists through opposition to the Maori. Over the past few years it is Maori nationhood which has exposed this deficiency in white New Zealanders; the Pakeha has got nothing and never realized it. (D.Awatere 1984:11).

What I contend is that Pakeha identity has been violently forged, legitimated and justified at the expense of the Maori. The supposed inferiority of the Slave alludes to the legitimation of the superiority of the Master. This thesis brings to light the notion that the Master's superiority is in question. The French feminist writer Cixous writes that we are the:

... learned or ignorant caretakers of several memories. When I write, language remembers without my knowing or indeed with my knowing, remembers the Bible, Shakespeare, Milton, the whole of literature, each book. Then, I who write, I inscribe an additional memory in language - a memory in progress - of what I have read personally, noticed, retained from a text or a language to the other. And the whole is poured back, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, into the river I sail. (H.Cixous, cited in S.Sellers 1994:xxi).

Pakeha and Maori are the "learned" and indeed "ignorant caretakers" of several memories as Cixous writes. In my writing here, and in my life, I live out the memories of discourse as a violence and the violent discursive strategies that have stereotyped Maori identity since print literacy arrived in Aotearoa with the coming of the Pakeha coloniser. My memory in progress is consciously pouring back this critique. The Maori writer and health professional, Irihapeti Ramsden in 1995 articulates that:

A series of mildly ridiculous and potentially crippling stereotypes for both cultures have arisen. For example, if the Pakeha are forward-looking, hard-nosed, highly individualistic technocrats who do not have a spiritual base, then Maori have become back-ward looking primitives, romantic, mystically relating to the earth and spiritual realm but without the economic skills and the technical infrastructure to cope in the twenty-first century. Good at teamsports though. (I.Ramsden 1995:256).
These powerful stereotypes permeate every aspect of life here in Aotearoa. For Ramsden, these stereotypes ensure that the "descendants of the colonists continue to be utterly confident that their experience is real and simply commonsense. So much so that many say that there is no Pakeha 'culture'. It is taken for granted as normal". (ibid. 256-257).

In a stark substantiation of these remarks I note the first sentence from one of Michael King's contributors in his book Pakeha - The Quest for Identity in New Zealand. The comment coming from Lindsay Head. She writes:

I am not someone who thinks a lot about New Zealand identity - I take it for granted.
(Head, cited in King 1991:23)

Kaupapa Maori Theory stipulates that the European-Pakeha identity can no longer be taken for granted. There is nothing 'commonsensical' or 'normal' about Pakeha culture or identity if being the norm is to be at the centre of a lop-sided, Euro-centric, phallo-centric, logo-centric racist universe.

The Education System in Aotearoa, more than any other governing social system in this country, has had the widest impact on Maori, in terms of Tino Rangatiratanga or Maori Sovereignty. From within the 'bowels' of the Education System emerged the 'Maori Problem'. If we adhere to the thesis that our identities, our Selves are constructed through language; then surely schools have been the most dependable sites of operation. The Master-Slave scenario, the English-Maori language dichotomising relationship of dominance and subjugation has been forged, perpetuated and legitimated within the monocultural education system. Where did this system emerge from?

Educational historian, Gary McCulloch in 1990 answered the question. He relates that the growth of modern schooling in Britain and the dissemination of its ideas and practices to Aotearoa, had a crucial impact on the structures and character of
education. As he relates, "the precedents of established institutions, the practices of schools and teachers, the traditions that underpinned and rationalised a wide variety of educational arrangements all had their sources in full or in part twelve thousand miles away". (G. McCulloch 1990:31). For him, recognition of this fact is imperative.

Explicit in this chapter is a retrieval of Pakeha identity within the traditions and 'rationalisations' of an education system which originated within a British and European context. Diverse and yet distinct theoretical discourses have constructed this European-Pakeha identity; not only the Pakeha as the Master, as the Subject but the Pakeha as his own slave, his own Other.

Foucault asks and answers the question:

What is an educational system, after all, if not a ritualisation of the word; if not a qualification of some fixing of roles for speakers; if not the constitution of a (diffuse) doctrinal group; if not a distribution and an appropriation of discourse, with all its learning and its powers? What is 'writing' (that or writers) if not a similar form of subjection, perhaps taking rather different forms, but whose main stresses are nonetheless analogous? (M. Foucault 1972:227).

In Aotearoa, the word 'ritualised' has been the English word; the Pakeha have been the first speakers, and Western philosophical traditions have accessed the power.

Charles Taylor (1989) has written that in the Western civilization individuals have become certain things. The humanitarianism that people share, their notions of freedom; personal and collective self-rule, have defined the political identities that individuals share. These definitions delve into the basic infrastructure of what is to be an individual with inner depths.

In contrast, Foucault was a staunch disbeliever in the 'inner depth' of humanity. He believed that the processes both political and social by which the Western European societies were ordered are not very apparent, indeed have become habitual and taken for granted, (like Pakeha identity). Foucault's target was to: "show people that a lot
of things that are a part of their landscape - that people think are universal - are the result of some very precise historical changes". (M.Foucault 1988:11)

All Foucault's analyses were against the idea of "universal necessities in human existence". (ibid.).

It is these universal necessities in the Western-European human existence which are the topic of this chapter. As Robert Young in his text *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* puts it:

> As we have seen the fundamental problem concerns the way in which knowledge - and therefore theory, or history - is constituted through the comprehension and incorporation of the other. (R.Young 1990:12)

Young further states that in Western philosophy when knowledge or theory comprehends the other, the alterity of the other vanishes as it becomes part of the 'same'. This 'ontological imperialism' as Levinas argues reaches as far back as Socrates (ibid:13).

In Western philosophical traditions the Subject of Knowledge is constructed and constituted through the comprehension and incorporation of its own Other. This is the essence of the "Philosophy of the Subject".

The 'universal necessities' in Western existence, of which Foucault alludes to, have allowed the knower to actually exist as a knower (I refer to Descartes' famous "I think therefore I am"). These are the notions of human beings in possession of a 'rational will', of human beings as 'individuals', of human beings as 'autonomous' and the notion of human beings as being 'ruled by reason'. One of the basic universal necessities of human existence itself is the necessity that we are simply 'human' as opposed to inhuman (thus the theoretical paradigm of Humanism).

The European-Pakeha education system that has operated in Aotearoa since colonisation; the European-Pakeha system that continues to operate today is based
in ‘White Mythologies’. The product of this ‘enlightened’ endeavours being the student, the consumer, the ‘client’ who enters the system in pursuit of Knowledge. The notion of pursuit is crucial to the context of movement, progress and enlightenment. Western philosophy and Western education presupposes a thorough historical, teleological orientation. It operates within a linear, progressive mentality.

The student or the product becomes a Subject, who pursues knowledge. This Subject is the human who pursues their humanity. This Subject is a child who pursues their adulthood. This Subject is a sexual being who pursues their sexuality. This Subject is an empty vessel in need of filling up.

Within today’s New Right epistemology, the Subject is a client, a consumer who vigorously competes within the market-place\textsuperscript{13} (education system); not for knowledge, but for information. Implicit within this Western paradigm is the pursuit of knowledge or information for the sake of power and control. To be informed about your Self or to know your Self is to be able to be in control of your Self, to have control over your Self and ultimately to have control over others (The Other).

One of the most radical dimensions of Foucault’s work was the claim that power and knowledge are not external to one another; they operate in history in a "mutually generative fashion". (Dreyfus, Rabinow, 1982:114). Thomas Docherty (1993:6) puts it succinctly:

From now on to know is to be in a position to enslave.

I return to the concept of ‘universal necessities’ in the Western-European existence; these concepts that inscribe and describe the Self. As Taylor relates:

We find the sense of life through articulating it.

[C. Taylor 1989:18].
For Taylor - not to have a framework is to fall into a life which is spiritually senseless. (ibid.).

It is my contention that all Western philosophy has been a striving to deal with the same fundamental problem: the relation between the realm of language and the realm of being. (T. Docherty 1993:7). This is particularly pertinent in respect to the Post-structuralist critique which can be said to be a critique of the West, of the Self, of the Subject and of itself. How has the Western-European Self inscribed It(Self). Ultimately, how has the Pakeha Self inscribed It(Self)?

Michael Peters (1993) has broached the topic of Postmodernism. For him Postmodernism is above all:

a central questioning of the absolutist and ahistorical categories and values, sustained and propagated through the symbolic unifying power of the grand narratives, by which ‘man’, ‘reason’, ‘history’ and ‘culture’ were first projected in universalist terms. (M. Peters 1993:1).

Peters maintains that Postmodernism seeks a new problematic for understanding the "social construction and self-constitution of individuals as collective or social subjects". (ibid.). Here we return to the Philosophy of the Subject or the Philosophy of Consciousness which is in Peters' words "the tradition of subject-centred reason which inaugurated modern Western philosophy, pre-figured in Descartes' cogito and brought to fruition by Kant". (ibid.).

Peters maintains that this problematic has been exhausted; this tradition of subject-centred reason. I contend, that in Theory, in terms of academic intellectual debate, it has certainly been 'thrashed to death', but in praxis the Subject is very much alive and kicking as exemplified in New Right educational philosophical rhetoric and practice.
James Marshall and Michael Peters are Pakeha New Zealanders who work in the area of educational philosophy. They have both written on the topic of New Right Theory and Post-modernist and Post-structuralist discourse. In their 1993 paper titled - 'Beyond the Philosophy of the Subject: Liberalism, Education and the Critique of Individualism' - they make the comment:

Specifically we suggest that the discourse of Liberalism is concerned with the ideological reproduction of us - of human beings - as "individuals". (J.Marshall, M.Peters 1993:74).

They claim that it is Liberalism that has shaped and determined self-understandings of ourselves as rational autonomous individuals. In essence, Liberalism has 'manufactured' the notion of a human being as a rational autonomous person. The project of liberal mass schooling and higher education in the late twentieth century is built on the liberal intellectual authority inherited form the Enlightenment. Marshall and Peters maintain that Liberalism is "grounded in a European universalism and rationalism heavily buttressed by highly individualist assumptions". (ibid:68).

My starting point is not the exhaustion of the Philosophy of the Subject nor indeed the exhaustion of Philosophy itself; it is the birth of the Subject and Liberalism.

LIBERALISM - THE INDIVIDUAL AS AN END IN HIMSELF

Before I begin my discussion, a comment is required concerning the andro-centric nature of European philosophical discourse; the predominance of the male pronoun in writing. I have decided not to change this; my contention is that the majority of 'Dead White Males' who have created and perpetuated European philosophical discourse, have done so, for the benefit of other White Males. In short, the female reality is ignored. I am in agreement with Cixous once again, in her contention that:

Philosophy is constructed on the premise of woman's abasement. (H.Cixous 1986:65).
My commentary on Liberalism is taken largely from J. Salwyn Schapiro’s text - Liberalism Its Meaning and History written in 1958. According to Schapiro, Liberalism is a phenomenon of the Western World originating in Western Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when feudalism was being displaced by the "modern order" of life. The term Liberalism is Spanish in origin, coming from the name of a political party the "Liberals". Since this time the term has been co-opted by many countries to designate a particular government, a party, a policy or merely an opinion. (J.Schapiro 1958:9).

Schapiro stipulates that as a philosophy, Liberalism does not fall into a closed category with unchanging dogmas. For him, it may be "characterised as an attitude of mind toward life and life’s problems that stresses the values of freedom for individuals, for minorities and for nations". (ibid.). The crucial point that Schapiro makes is that every individual is to be treated as AN END IN HIMSELF, not as a means to advance the interests of others. The founding dictum of Liberalism is the notion of the individual as an end in himself. (ibid.).

The British writer Bertrand Russell writing on the History of Western Philosophy earlier in 1946 states that:

The distinctive character of the whole movement is, in a certain wide sense, individualism; but this is a vague term until further defined. (B.Russell 1946:620).

Russell relates that the Greek philosophers were not individualists in the modern sense as in Descartes' fundamental certainty, "I think, therefore I am". Russell maintains that most philosophy has had, since Descartes, an intellectually individualistic aspect.

Schapiro states that Liberalism as a movement began in the Renaissance, in the Protestant Reformation and in the Scientific Revolution. As a system of thought, Liberalism expressed itself most notoriously in the period known as the
Enlightenment. Indeed this intellectual revolution spread all over the Western World and continues to pursue the area of the non-West today. The men we associate with the Enlightenment are, from France: Voltaire, Rousseau and Diderot. From Britain, men such as Locke, Hume and Adam Smith were prominent. From Germany: Goethe, Lessing and Kant. From America: Jefferson, Franklin and Paine. (J.Schapiro 1958:16).

UNIVERSAL NECESSITIES IN HUMAN EXISTENCE

FREEDOM

Liberalism has often been posited as the way of Freedom. For Foucault, the notion of freedom is suspect. His role was to show people that:

... they are much freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and destroyed. (M.Foucault 1988:10).

Peter Gay, (1966), writing on the Enlightenment relates that: the men of the Enlightenment united on a programme of humanity, secularism and cosmopolitanism and above all, freedom. They argued and articulated freedom from authoritarianism, freedom from God and the Church, freedom of trade, freedom of speech and freedom of the moral man to make his own way in the world. (ibid:3).

Aligned with this freedom of the individual is the notion of freedom of association. Liberalism has advocated the right to form - "associations of all kinds - political, social, economic, religious, and cultural - that have as their objective the advancement of the legitimate interests of their members". (J.Schapiro 1958:10). This is what the vanguard of the New Right movement in Aotearoa adhere to.

Intellectual freedom is the most prized by liberals. Schapiro writes of the school of thinkers who become known as the ‘philosophes’. In France and indeed throughout the world these men developed a new pattern of life and thought in books of "great originality and of unmatched literary power". (ibid:17)
The concept of freedom is also discussed by Charles Taylor (1989). His discussion on the concept of freedom is related to the affirmation of what he calls "ordinary life". Taylor writes:

The ancient notion of the good, either in the Platonic mode, as the key to cosmic order, or in the form of the good life à la Aristotle, sets a standard for us in nature, independent of our will. The modern notion of freedom which develops in the seventeenth century portrays this as the independence of the subject, his determining of his own purposes without interference from external authority. (C. Taylor 1989:82).

This new conception of freedom arose partly from the anthropological transfer of the prerogatives of God. This modern stress on freedom as self-determination was what Kant came to insist upon, following in the footsteps of Rousseau.

In the context of New Right philosophy in Aotearoa, Maxine Barrett, who has written on the topic of freedom and equality in the Report of The Royal Commission on Social Policy (1988), makes the conclusion that in general we know that freedom is the absence of constraint. Her discussion of freedom is couched within the context of New Right positioning. She writes:

It has been one of the mainsprings of the New Right position that freedom (of which Hayek is a prominent example), and equality are in opposition and that egalitarianism destroys liberty. (M. Barrett 1988:67).

Here she quotes the Austrian economist Hayek:

From the fact that people are very different, it follows that if we treat them equally, the result must be inequality in their actual position, and that the only way to place them in an equal position would be to treat them differently...the equality before the law which freedom requires, leads to material inequality...The desire to making people more alike in their condition cannot be accepted in a free society as a justification for further discriminatory coercion. (Hayek, cited in Barrett 1988:67).
Barret looks at the way freedom means different things to different people. Those political philosophers who have defended welfare rights emphasize positive freedom or freedom to. Those who wish to defend individual rights to non-interference and property rights emphasize freedom from or negative freedom. The writers S. Middleton, A. Jones and J. Codd make the connection:

In brief the central arguments of the New Right emphasize individual choice and a limited role for the state in defense of individual liberties and property rights. (S. Middleton, et al. 1990: ix).

In the same text, Hugh Lauder states that personal freedom is closely linked to the operation of the free market. (Ibid: 7). The catch-cry is "we must be free to choose". Full freedom amounts to availability and capacity to exercise meaningful and effective choice.

Within the context of New Right philosophy concerning freedom and choice, Marshall and Peters in their text - 'The Politics of 'Choice' and 'Community'" (1988), write that it is not difficult to see the application of public choice theory in the Picot Report of 1987.

The taskforce believed that in creating more 'consumer choice' in the education system, it would ensure greater equity. Parents should be free to choose which schools to send their children to (zoning restrictions removed). Pupils should be free to choose to study technology as opposed to art. Parents should be free to choose their community representatives on the Board of Trustees. Schools should be free to choose what sponsorship they think best for their school's welfare.

RIGHTS

To speak of universal, natural or human rights is to connect respect for human life and integrity with the notion of autonomy. Taylor (1989) relates that our conceptions of what makes humans worthy of respect have shaped the actual schedule of rights.
that we recognize and that these rights have evolved over the centuries. Our conceptions of what makes humans worthy of respect have also changed. (ibid:77).

The notion of rights has become highly problematic. Any liberal democratic society must solve a problem of balancing the scope of rights against democratic decision making. Liberalism and democracy may be in tension. The first point I make is that there is a certainty that we all, as human beings, have rights simply by the fact of our humanity.

The notion of a right which is also called a ‘subjective right’ is a phenomenon which developed in the Western legal tradition and this legal privilege is seen as a possession of the agent to whom it is attributed. (C.Taylor 1989:11). Taylor notes that at first these rights were differentiated possessions. For example: some people had the right to participate in assemblies, or to collect tolls on a certain river. The revolution in natural law theory in the seventeenth century consisted in appropriating the language or rights to express universal moral norms. Here the notions of Natural Rights arose and we spoke of the ‘rights to liberty’ and freedom which everyone has. (ibid.). Taylor writes it thus:

... in one way, to speak of a universal, natural right to life doesn’t seem much of an innovation. The change seems to be one of form. The earlier way of putting it was that there was a natural law against taking innocent life. But the difference lies not in what is forbidden but in the place of the subject. Law is what I must obey. It may confer on me certain benefits, here the immunity that my life, too, is to be respected; but fundamentally I am under law. (C.Taylor 1989:11).

Thus, Liberalism states that we all have equal rights under the law. Schapiro writes, that in order to protect the rights of individuals and of minorities, Liberalism has placed "highly important limitations on the power of government". (J.Schapiro 1958:11). According to the American Declaration of Independence, these rights known as civil or natural rights, consist of "life, liberty and the pursit of happiness". In the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, they are expressed as "liberty, property, security and resistance of oppression".

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Bertrand Russell's discussion of Liberalism is significant here. Russell (1946) states that early liberalism was opposed to everything medieval, both in politics and philosophy because medieval theories sanctioned the powers of the Church and the King. (ibid:621).

JOHN LOCKE

One of the most influential philosophers in Western philosophy was John Locke. He postulated that the government can never own the individual. He insisted that people own themselves. No-one is by nature a slave. To understand the various doctrines of Locke we have to understand human rights as opposed to monarchy and slavery.

Locke (1632-1704), is regarded by many writers as the founder of empiricism in Britain. Russell believed that Locke was the founder of philosophical Liberalism as much of empiricism in the theory of knowledge. (B.Russell 1946:628). Russell states that property is very prominent in Locke's political Liberalism, and is, according to him, the main reason for the institution of civil government. Here he quotes Locke:

The great and chief end of men uniting unto commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property: to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting. (Locke, cited in B.Russell 1946:656).

Locke believed that the right to private property precedes the civil law, for it is grounded in natural moral law. (S.Stumph 1966:287). The origin of economic Liberalism of the laissez-faire type may be traced to the ethical and political individualism of Locke's philosophy. (F.Thilly 1914:357).

This economic philosophy is based on the idea that the individual has a natural right to exercise his activity in the economic sphere with least interference from society or government. Thilly (1914) writes that this individualistic view, found in Locke, is reflected in the economic theories of the French physiocrats, Francois Quesnay, A. Turgot, and in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. These men were opposed to the old
mercantile system which sprang up in Europe at the closing of the Middle Ages. (ibid:357).

RIGHTS TRADITION IN AOTEAROA

In Aotearoa, the writer David Mckenzie (1975), writing on the ‘Changing Concept of Equality in New Zealand’, quotes Charles Kingsley:

If a citizen has one right above all others to demand anything of his country, it is that he should be educated, that whatever capacities he may have in him, however small, may have a fair chance of development. (Kingsley, cited in D.Mckenzie 1975:93).

Mckenzie states that New Zealand joined other Western nations in providing schooling not as a privilege, nor as a matter of individual wish, but "as a right bestowed upon all by virtue of citizenship". (ibid.).

Within the context of New Right philosophy in Aotearoa, Richard Bates is one writer among many who has articulated on the ‘New Cult of Efficiency’ in Educational policy, referring to it as the "politics of selfishness".

For Bates, the pivotal feature of New Right influence in Educational policy is the attempt to curb "person rights and to substitute an aggressive reassertion of property rights". (R.Bates 1990:41). These property rights, in contrast to the principles of equity underlying person rights, emphasise the "rights of individuals to enter into relationships on the basis and extent of their property". (ibid.).

Another writer, Ivan Snook (1989), has written on the ideological foundations of the Educational Reforms in Aotearoa. For him, Robert Nozich provides the best intellectual ‘map’ of the territory of rights. (ibid:9). Rights according to Nozich are restricted to non-intervention rights. There are no welfare rights; no rights of recipience for food, medicine or decent social conditions.
In contemporary terms the 'user' must pay and users are seen as "atomic individuals never as communities". (I.Snook 1989:10). For Snook, Nozick's justice is excessively individualistic and humans appear to meet, merely as traders, never as members of a humane community.

Marshall, Peters and Smith's (1990) account of Nozick asserts that "if human beings are to be of worth they must be free to pursue their aims and goals". (ibid:11). Therefore, without this right to freedom to acquire property, people would not be of worth because they could not pursue their goals.

In essence, for Nozick, all rights become property rights. This right even to be a person can be construed in terms of self-ownership. (ibid.). In Nozick's view we see that property rights lead to a market society where individuals are in control of their property provided that it was justly attained in the free market. Welfare rights do not appeal to fundamental property rights, therefore they are unjust.

According to Marshall, Peters and Smith, Nozick's philosophy is descended from Locke. (ibid:10). The economic philosophy of Hayek, who has had considerable influence on New Right theorists and economists, is also descended from Locke. Marshall, Peters and Smith propose that Hayek argues for a strict limitation of all coercive power, so as to allow the individual to function unlimited within the free market.

For both Hayek and Nozick, the role of the state is to be limited. For Hayek, it is to defend the freedom of the market. For Nozick, it is to defend the freedom of the consumer to acquire property. Education has become property or the commodity to be purchased in the Market-place of the Community.

What I have attempted to do so far, is to illustrate that the discourse of Liberalism is an extensive one. As such the origins of the 'individual' reach back into classical philosophical paradigms; these paradigms in turn have been elaborated upon, extended into modern philosophical paradigms such as New Right ideological
discourse. The founding dictum of Liberalism, encapsulated in classical and modern, neo-liberalism is the notion of the individual as 'an end in himself'.

European philosophy is concerned with the ideological reproduction of the individual. The notions of freedom and rights have been elaborated upon in the context of Michel Foucault's 'universal necessities in human existence'. Also I have illustrated that New Right market-liberalism is a revival of classical liberalism with its doctrines of individual freedom, public choice and minimal government interference. Rights have become mere property rights; are posed also as rights to compete in the market-place. Individualism has itself become a commodity. Knowledge also becomes the commodity. As many writers in Aotearoa have illustrated, this has serious consequences for the Education system that prevails in Aotearoa.

The 1987 Treasury Brief to the incoming Government is rife with New Right rhetoric. Also a report titled - A Report Commissioned by the New Zealand Business Round Table on New Zealand Schools and Current Reform is another report that espoused New Right ideologies. The author of the report Stuart Sexton, a devotee of the free market mentality, leaves no doubt about his ideological convictions and his intent.

One of the major underlying contentions of this thesis is that European philosophical paradigms have constructed human beings as Subjects. The remaining section of this chapter discusses the transformation of the individual. This is the individual who becomes the Subject. Further deconstruction of the individual is required.

THE BIRTH OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The first major undertaking before me here is the problematising of the category of the 'individual'; the central tenet of liberal discourse. In contemporary philosophical discourse, this category is known as the Subject of Consciousness, the Philosophy of the Subject or the Philosophy of Consciousness. Foucault, who, as Edward Said notes, is sometimes referred to as the "philosopher of the death of man", (Said, cited
in J. Arac 1988:11), has given wide-spread acknowledgement to the notions of Man the Subject, Man and his Doubles, The Same and the Other.

Schapiro (1958) stresses that one of the fundamental postulates of Liberalism is the moral worth, absolute value and essential dignity of the human personality. The emphasis placed by Liberalism on intellectual freedom derives from the conviction that man is essentially a rational creature, capable of discovering objective truth through the application of reason; according to the scientific method of research, experimentation and verification. Man, the rationalist looks primarily to science for enlightenment; reason, not revelation is his mentor. (Ibid:12)

Regarding my own thought on the notion of ‘individualism’, I note that the notion of individual itself is predicated upon division. The concept presupposes a separate existence, or a split. It is this sense of a split which is the essence of the self-identical, fully transparent thinking Subject, known as the Cogito.

As Liberalism itself was always opposed to something - opposed to constraint from governing bodies, opposed to God or theology, opposed to censorship; Western philosophy itself is built or perpetuated through dualisms, dialectics, oppositions, competing discourses. As postmodern discourse is predicated upon modern discourse; so modern philosophy is predicated upon ancient thought and philosophy.

ORDER IN THE COSMOS

In order to review the categorising of the individual, we must view the notion of individualism in former times. Russell (1946) writes that the philosophers of Greece, down to and including Aristotle, were not individualists, in the sense that they thought of a man as essentially a member of a community. (Ibid:622). He relates that Plato's Republic is concerned with the definition of the good community, not the individual. He believes that individualism developed, coinciding with the loss of political liberty from the time of Alexander onwards: being represented by the Stoics and the Cynics. (B.Russell 1946:622).
Concerning the ancient Greek mode of thinking, Taylor (1989) relates that for Plato the higher life was ruled by reason and reason itself was defined in terms of a vision of ‘Order’ in the cosmos and in the soul. Gaining mastery over oneself involved shifting the hegemony from the senses to reason; was a matter of changing the direction of our soul’s vision to the moral strength that resides outside of us. To have access to the higher is to be turned towards and in tune with this cosmic order which is shaped by the Good. (C.Taylor 1989:143).

Thilly (1914) also expresses the earliest Greek philosophy as being naturalistic: its attention was directed to Nature which is conceived of as being alive, ontological. From external nature Greek philosophy turns its eye inward, on man himself. Thilly writes:

Plato and Aristotle build upon the foundations laid by the master, Socrates, and construct rational theories of knowledge (logic), conduct (ethics), and the state (politics). They likewise work out comprehensive systems of speculative thought (metaphysics), and interpret the universe in terms of mind, or reason. We may, therefore characterize this philosophy as critical: it investigates the principles of knowledge; as rationalistic: it accepts the competence of reason in the search after truth; as humanistic: it studies man; as spiritualistic or idealistic: it makes mind an important if not the chief factor in the explanation of reality". (F.Thilly 1914:18).

An important point is that this philosophy is dualistic in that it also recognizes matter as a factor in reality, though secondary to mind.

To summarise: Taylor relates that the Subject or the Self who came down from the dominant tradition of the ancients, was the man who came most fully to himself when he was in touch with a cosmic order, and in touch with it in the way most suitable to it as an order of ideas; that is, by reason. This is, as Taylor relates, the heritage of Plato. Order in the human soul is inseparable from rational vision of the order of being. The crucial point to understand is that there is no notion of the Self in the modern sense; that is, of an identity which I can define for myself without
reference to what surrounds me and the world in which I am set. The Subject now, is a Self, he or she could not be, for the ancients.

This is the significant contrast - the contrast between the ancient mode of thinking and the modern mode of thought. The modern Subject, is self-defining whereas in previous thought, the Subject is defined in relation to a cosmic order. (C.Taylor 1975:6). This modern Self only comes into being in the seventeenth century. This is the shift which underlies Descartes’ Cogito, where the existence of the Self is demonstrated while everything outside, even God, is in doubt. (ibid:34-35). As Taylor describes it:

Ancient Greece had supposedly achieved the most perfect unity between nature and the highest human expressive form. To be human came naturally, as it were. But this was the price of the development of reason to that higher stage of self-clarity which is essential to our realization as radically free beings....in other words the beautiful Greek synthesis had to die because, Man had to be inwardly divided in order to grow. (C.Taylor 1975:35).

Included in Taylor’s notion of the modern self is the ideal of the "disengaged self", capable of objectifying not only the surrounding world but also his own emotions, inclinations, fears and compulsions, achieving a distance and self-possession which allows him to act ‘rationally’. (C.Taylor 1989:21).

Specifically, this includes the Kantian picture of individuals as pure rational agents. Disengagement from the cosmic order meant that the human agent was no longer to be understood as an element in a larger meaningful order. As Taylor states it: "His paradigm purposes are to be discovered within. He is on his own". (ibid:193).

MIND - BODY DUALISM

Richard Rorty has written extensively on the history of philosophy. One of his historical excursions is into classical and scholastic philosophy where he makes us aware of how different the so-called mind-body problem was before and after
Descartes - to show that what people now take to be obvious and intuitive distinctions did not exist prior to Descartes' "invention of the mind". Descartes invented the mind in the sense that it is only after Descartes that the problem of consciousness became a central problem for philosophy. (R.Bernstein 1986:30).

Briefly stated, the history of modern philosophy is the history of the rise and fall of the "mind" and the prized philosophical discipline - "epistemology". (Ibid:27).

Rorty has written that:

We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as the tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture to the eighteenth century, and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (R.Rorty, cited in R.Bernstein 1986:25).

RENE DESCARTES - THE FATHER OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Rene Descartes was born in 1596 in Touraine. He was known as the "father of modern philosophy"; the father of what became known as rationalism - the basic tenet of eighteenth century Enlightenment. The Continental rationalists - Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza fashioned a new ideal for philosophy. In turn the British empiricists that followed these thinkers - Locke, Berkely and Hume had great impact on philosophical reality thereafter. Descartes was very much influenced by the precision and certainty of mathematics as compared to the doubt and disputation of philosophy. His theme was that of intellectual certainty.

Descartes was determined to discover the basis of intellectual certainty in HIS OWN REASON (S.Stumph 1966:249). His was the insistence of the necessity of method to arrive at sets of truths. He proposed:
... this conclusion, I think therefore I am, is the first and most certain of all which occur to one who philosophizes in an orderly way. (Descartes, cited in S.Stumph 1966:255).

Descartes’ theory throws the individual thinker back on his own responsibility; requires him to build an order of thought for himself in the first person singular. We see that there are in Descartes’ thought, a series of dualisms expressed in the notions of thought and extension, spiritual and corporeal, mind and body. The mind-body dualism is one of the Grand Narratives of Western Philosophy. It invented Philosophy.

Taylor (1989) writes that Descartes places moral sources within the individual. God’s existence becomes a stage in my progress towards science through the methodological ordering of evident insight. God’s theorem in my system. "God’s existence is a theorem in my system of perfect science". (ibid:157). What I now meet is myself: I achieve a clarity and a fullness of self-presence that was lacking before. (ibid.).

Bertrand Russell sums it up well; this injection of the individual into philosophy, this validation of the mind. In making the contention "I think therefore I am", Descartes made the basis of knowledge different for each person, since for each, the starting point was his own existence, not other individuals or the community. The "I think I am" makes mind more certain than matter and MY mind ‘for me’, more certain than the minds of others. (B.Russell 1946:586).

Taylor (1989) explains it that the Greeks were fond of the notion ‘know thyself’ but they didn’t normally speak of the human agent as ‘ho autos’ or use the term in a context which we would translate into the indefinite article.

What develops in the modern self is the dualism of inside/outside - this becomes dominant in the West. Augustine anticipated Descartes in that he distinguishes between inner and outer man. The outer is the bodily or what people have in common with animals and the senses. The inner is the soul. The route to God is in
the individual. Taylor cites Augustine as the agent who introduces the inwardness of radical reflexivity to Western thought. (C. Taylor 1989:131).

Descartes' ethic as well as his epistemology calls for disengagement from the world and the body and the assumption of an instrumental stance towards them. Rationality is no longer defined substantially in terms of the order of being; rather in terms of the standards by which people construct orders in science and life. Rationality is now an internal property of subjective thinking rather than consisting in its vision of reality.

Locke reifies the mind to an extraordinary degree. He embraces an atomism of mind - the individual's understanding is constructed out of the building blocks of certain ideas. The detachable consciousness generates a picture of the self as pure independent consciousness which promises self control and remaking.

As I have illustrated, the construction of the individual as the central tenet of Liberalism is extensive. Central to the categorising of the individual are the notions of disengagement and inward reflexivity. Whilst earlier ancient discourses of the individual incorporated the notions of 'order in the cosmos' and the holistic relationship between Man and Nature; later European philosophical discourses allowed a 'shift' in perception; how the individual, through the process of subjectification of the Self, comes to divorce themselves from the World of Nature. In short, this is the creation of the Mind/Body dichotomy.

The notion of Power and Control are paramount to any understanding of the creation of the Individual as a Subject. The creation of inward thinking, whilst posited as an emancipatory project, can be seen as a powerful discourse that defines, negates and seeks to control. The writing and thought of Michel Foucault is discussed in this next section; his analysis of individuality and subjectivity offers challenging perspectives on human reality.
FOUCAULT’S VERSION OF THE SUBJECT

Foucault states that his objective in his writing has been to:

...create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.
(M.Foucault 1982:208).

Foucault did not write about Polynesian or Maori culture - his particular ethnology was Western Culture.

Foucault was born in Poitiers, France in 1926. When he died of an AIDS-related condition in 1984, he had become one of the most influential French philosophers since the end of World War Two. He had been frequently termed Philosopher, historian, structuralist, Marxist; acquiring various labels, but I am inclined to agree with James Marshall (1990:11) that Foucault should "be taken for himself and not be classified neatly into recognizable categories".

Foucault’s work is relevant for me because he was an Other - his homosexuality posited him as an Other in dominant Western society. (Foucault however would not name himself as other). As such, his analyses, his perceptions and his critique of the dominant Western culture; his writing on the notions of identity construction and Power are particularly pertinent to my discussion of Western culture and its relationship to Kaupapa Maori Theory. In the closing section of Madness and Civilization, Foucault referred to some fundamental form of Otherness which "lies beyond the grasp of reason and science and which in some unexplained way seems to give them their possibility". He wondered whether this Otherness was the opening for a "total contestation" of Western culture. (H.Dreyfus, P.Rabinow 1982:11).

Foucault contends that man did not exist before the end of the eighteenth century as anything more than the "potency of life, the fecundity of labour, or the historical
density of language". (M. Foucault 1970:308-309). For him there was no epistemological consciousness of man.

In this Classical episteme, human nature, nature and their relations are definite functional moments and man as a reality with his own density "as the difficult object and sovereign subject of all possible knowledge, has no place in it". (ibid:310).

What Classical thought reveals is the power of discourse. Foucault relates that Classical language as the common discourse of representation and things, as the place within which nature and human nature intersect, excludes what could be called a 'science' of man. Man as primary reality with his own density as the difficult object and sovereign subject of all possible knowledge has not appeared. Suddenly representation becomes problematic. Foucault writes:

When natural history becomes biology, when the analysis of wealth becomes economics, when, above all, reflection upon language becomes philology, and Classical discourse, in which being and representation found their common locus, is eclipsed, then in the profound upheaval of such an archaeological mutation, man appears in his ambiguous position as an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows. (M. Foucault 1970:312).

Foucault's predominant thesis is that Man is an invention of modern thought. In his text, The Order Of Things, (1970), his enterprise is one of 'archaeology'. This enquiry is:

... an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori, and in the element of what positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon afterwards. (M. Foucault 1970:xxi,xxii).

Foucault isolates three major epochs in Western Thought. These are: the Renaissance, the Classical Age, and Modernity. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982, contend that for

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Foucault, the Classical Age set itself the project of constructing a "universal method of analysis which would yield perfect certainty by perfectly ordering representations and signs to mirror the ordering of the world, the order of being - for being, the Classical Age, had a universal order". (H.Dreyfus, P.Rabinow 1982:19).

This universal method of analysis, as displayed as a table, lay forth the representations which would give people the picture of the true order of the world. Here Foucault sites Descartes as the father of rationalism; the figure who sought certitude through the search for a method that guaranteed certainty. 'The thinker' gave an artificial description of the order which was there already. Dreyfus and Rabinow reiterate; Man clarified but did not create. (ibid:20).

In this 'archaeological mutation' Man who was once a being among others is now a Subject among Objects. "Man becomes the subject and the object of his own understanding". (ibid:28).

One writer, among many, who has sought to clarify Foucault's thought is David Hoy. In his article - 'Foucault: Modern or Postmodern? (1988), he attempts to explain Foucault's notion of the essence of modern thought - of the appearance of Man the Subject and Object of his own understanding.

In a simplistic sense; Man is separated from his own thought. The Mind is created - the split between Mind and Body is complete. Hoy explains that modern thought turns from the world to ask about the being to whom the world appears, and the being thus posited is called Man. (D.Hoy 1988:15). Thought tries to think what had remained unthought, namely, not how the world appears to thought, but how thought could itself be something to which the world could appear. Thought is at first its own unthought.

Gradually it becomes a feature of the modern to inquire into thought. Descartes first takes the cogito as completely transparent to itself, but for later empiricism the metaphor for thought is a blank slate or a black box.
Hoy relates that modern thought cannot leave the unthought alone. It cannot rest content with the thought that there is more about itself that it does not know and that might threaten the soundness of what it believes it knows. In the *Order of Things*, Foucault wrote it superbly:

... the whole of modern thought is imbued with the necessity of thinking the unthought - of reflecting the contents of the IN ITSELF in the form of the FOR ITSELF, of ending man's alienation by reconciling him with his own essence, of making explicit the horizon that provides experience with its background of immediate and disarmed proof, of lifting the veil of the Unconscious. (M. Foucault 1970:327).

In *Discipline and Punish* (1979) Foucault makes the contention that for a long time ordinary individuality, the everyday individuality of everybody, remained below the threshold of description. Huckle Gutman (1988), following on Foucault's theorizing, concentrates on Rousseau's "Confessions" in his discussion of individuality and the connection with the turning of real lives, into writing, functioning as a procedure of objectification and subjection.

WRITING THE SUBJECT

Gutman writes that Rousseau reveals and celebrated the atomistic, autonomous self. For him, Rousseau is perhaps the first human being to insist upon his own singularity. (ibid:100).

The emergence of the individual Self is dependent on the activity of writing. This is one of the crucial pivots in the emergence of the modern Subject. The connection with print literacy is paramount. In the Western philosophical paradigm the individual finds a sense of identity through articulation.

Gutman traces the theme of the confession back to Saint Augustine who also wrote his confessions. Augustine however does not celebrate either himself or his own autonomy - his is for the glorification of God. For Rousseau, the Self is the Subject
of the discourse; thus revealing himself in all his completeness to the gaze of the reader.

In effect, Rousseau confesses in order to justify his existence. He 'constitutes' a Self in writing. Gutman comments on the major shift in consciousness that has taken place between Rousseau and Augustine. This consciousness emerges in the notion of division that epitomises the modern Self. The first essential move in the constitution of the Self is division. Rousseau divides head and heart; reason and emotions; nature and society; Self and society.

In the process of examining the division of the self and the world, Rousseau creates the Romantic paradigm; the recounting of the history of the self so that the self can concurrently create itself in writing and affirm that self it has created.

Rousseau helps invent, justify and circulate techniques which constitute the modern Subject, providing various means by which this Self can be made Subject and Object.

THE SUBJECT

Foucault's analyses reveal forms of power which make individuals Subjects. For him, there are two meanings of the word SUBJECT:

... subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.
(M.Foucault 1982:212).

First I will discuss the notion of being subject to someone else by control and dependence. In his work he has identified three modes of objectification which transform human beings into Subjects. These are:

1. modes on inquiry, scientific and quasi-scientific discourses that defined humans as subjects who spoke, produced or simply lived (the topics in The Order of Things).
2. dividing practices which separated the mad from the insane, the ill from the healthy, the criminal from the lawful, and in which the subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others (Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, Discipline and Punish).

3. the way a human being turns him or herself into a Subject (The History of Sexuality).

Dreyfus and Rabinow contend that Foucault's book, Discipline and Punish is a very sombre recounting of the "growth of disciplinary technology within the larger historical grid of bio-power" (ibid:143). Indeed, for Foucault, the notion of the modern individual and the notion of society (as understood in the social sciences) are joint developments.

The aim of this disciplinary technology is to forge a docile body that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved. Though Foucault concentrates on the penal institution initially, his study of prisons must be seen within the wider context of disciplinary technologies which target the body first and then the soul. For Foucault, punishment must be analyzed in context with the disciplinary techniques and practices in the hospital, the military, the asylum, the school and the workplace.

Important in Foucault's study is the notion of governance in connection with modern power. He names the struggles against these all-invasive technologies of domination as struggles against the "government of individualization". (ibid.). The utilization of individuals becomes important for the preservation and legitimation of the state. Individuals become instrumental to the ends of the state.

In the central section of Discipline and Punish, titled - "The means of correct training", Foucault relates how micro-technologies bring together the exercise of power and the constitution of knowledge in the organization of space and time along ordered lines, to facilitate constant means of surveillance and the operation of judgement and evaluation.
The notion of normalizing detention is paramount in Foucault's repertoire. Criminals become objects to be manipulated and normalized. For Foucault, the 'examination' is a major theme of contention in disciplinary technologies. He views the examination in this light:

The examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgement. It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish...That is why, in all the mechanisms of discipline, the examination is highly ritualized. In it are combined the ceremony of power and the form of the experiment, the deployment of force and the establishment of truth. At the heart of the procedures of discipline, it manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected. (M.Foucault 1979:184-185).

The compilation of dossiers on individuals makes a 'case' of the individual. The function of individualization changes. In regimes like the feudal one, individuality was most highly marked at the top. The more one exercised power, the more one was marked as an individual - by honours and prestige.

However, in the modern disciplinary regime, individualization is descending. Through the process of observation and surveillance, individuals are subject to control. Power fixes objective individuality in print. Humans are products of the complex strategic developments in the field of power and the multiple developments in the human sciences. Foucault makes the assertion that the very self-definition of the human sciences as scholarly 'disciplines' is closely linked to the spread of disciplinary technologies. The social sciences were first located within the institutions of power - the prison, the hospital.

Now I will discuss the second notion of Foucault's rendition of the Subject; subject to your own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. How does a human being turn him or herself into a Subject? Simply put; Western man has become a confessing animal.
In the *History of Sexuality*, Foucault makes a shift to elaborate on the sexualization of our bodies. To put it succinctly - sexuality is a historical construct, not a biological referent. Just as he has disputed the notions of there being a unique quality called human reason, or human rationality; Foucault also disputes the notion that we have a unique sexual essence. The Subject is seen as constructing a sexual Self. J.G. Merquior (1985) makes the comment:

> In the History of Sexuality the self remains a prey to power, but now the story of its production by power is told, as it were, from the inside. (J.Merquior 1985:119).

Technologies of domination become technologies of the Self. The key to this technology is the belief, prominent in the West, that it is possible to tell the truth about one's Self. Foucault's thesis is that the human sciences have seized on the 'confessed' body as an object of social concern and governmental manipulation.

Foucault states that sexuality was 'invented' as an instrument in the spread of 'biopower'. The historical construction of sexuality began at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Empirical scientific classifications of sexual activity were carried out in the context of a concern for life. Foucault sees the confession, and especially the confession about one's sexuality as a central component in the burgeoning technologies for the discipline and control of bodies, populations and society itself. In particular, his analysis revolves around the theme of renunciation. He writes:

> We inherit the tradition of Christian morality which makes self-renunciation the condition for salvation. To know oneself was paradoxically the way to self-renunciation. (M.Foucault 1988:22).

He relates that there has been an inversion between the hierarchy of the two principles of antiquity, - "Take care of yourself" and "know thyself". In Greco-Roman culture, knowledge of oneself appeared as the consequence of taking care of yourself. In the modern world, "knowledge of oneself constitutes the fundamental principle". (ibid:22).
The new form of the Self is to be seen in the first and second century when introspection becomes increasingly detailed. Here, the relationship is established between writing and vigilance, between inscribing and describing our selves. He writes it thus:

...in traditional political life, oral culture was largely dominant, and therefore rhetoric was important. But the development of the administrative structures and the bureaucracy of the imperial period increased the amount and role of writing in the political sphere. In Plato’s writing, dialogue gave way to the literary pseudodialogue. But by the Hellenistic age, writing prevailed, and real dialectic passed to correspondence. Taking care of oneself became linked to constant writing activity. The self is something to write about, a theme or object (subject) of writing activity...it is one of the most ancient Western traditions. (M. Foucault 1988:27).

The key to the technology of the Subject is the belief that one can, with the help of experts, tell the truth about oneself. This is a pivotal connection in the psychiatric services, in law, in medicine and in education. We take it for granted that there is a truth to be discovered through the self-examination of consciousness and the confession of one’s thoughts. Foucault analyses the evolution of the confession as a mechanism of power that has transformed every desire of the body and the soul into a discourse of power.

Foucault is unrelenting in his analysis of the construction of human beings as Subjects. He encourages people to rethink all the notions of individuality that have been posited by European philosophical paradigms; elaborated in Enlightenment discourses such as Liberalism. The notion of autonomy bears the brunt of Foucault’s critique.

AUTONOMY AND REASON

A central feature of the modern and ancient European moral outlook is the notion of autonomy. For Foucault, the notion of a self (autos), able to deliberate upon and accept laws (nomos), so as to act autonomously as opposed to following laws
heteronomously is a fiction. Simply put; there is no autos to act upon the nomos. Merquior reiterates Foucault’s critique:

Now while Foucault’s scorn of interests, in his analysis of power, left him without much use of the concept of freedom as personal independence, his conflation of subjectivity and subjection, besides undermining the notion of reflection as self-development, made a mockery of the idea of freedom as individual autonomy. (J. Merquior 1985:117).

In short, Foucault proposes that individuals have been constructed to think that they are free and autonomous and that this very construction has permitted the advance of power-knowledge and the subjugation of people as Subjects to lead docile, useful practical lives in service of the state. Foucault’s contention is that people are not as free as they think they are - here, the emphasis is definitely on the word think.

The Subject of reason is in dire need of legitimation. For Thomas Docherty (1993), reason produces an administered society, not a rational society as we had hoped for. As for rationality; in the world of the death camps, "everything was rationalised". (ibid:13)

Foucault points out that the production of reason is itself dependent upon a primary act of exclusion and incarceration: what reason identifies as its Other - madness, has to be identified and imprisoned in order to enable reason to legitimate itself.

Reason, in short, has to produce the ‘scandal’ of its Other to keep itself going. (T. Docherty 1993:14).

EUROPEAN IDENTITY - THE SUBJECT UNDER SIEGE

One of the major undertakings in this chapter been the problematising of the category of the Individual which is the central tenet of Liberal discourse in European philosophical Narratives. The philosophical paradigms of Liberalism have informed the practices and theoretical bases of Western-European educational institutions. The
dominant monocultural Education System in Aotearoa owes its heritage to the Grand Narrative of Liberalism.

We can be in agreement with Foucault when he suggests that all of Western civilization has been subjugated, and philosophers have only certified the fact by "referring all thought and all truth to consciousness, to the Self, to the Subject". (M.Foucault 1989:61). Foucault urges people to recognize the birth of a world where the Subject is not one but split, not sovereign, not an absolute origin but a "function ceaselessly modified". (ibid.).

The Subject of Liberal discourses has progressed to become the basic unit of our political, social and economic order as posited within the New Right’s cult of efficiency. At its worst, this ‘progressive’ individualism, is a possessive, methodological and highly abstract individualism.

What I am intimating is that the notion of the Self, of the Subject, in Western culture, is under siege. Whilst Foucault argues for a total contestation of Western culture, he does not propose a ‘way out’ of this problematic. His objective perhaps was just to provoke thought; a different way of thinking.

In the concluding section of this chapter, I will discuss the notions of progress as elucidated within European philosophy, the notion of history, the notion of the Enlightenment and the part that ‘time’ plays in the drama that binds all these partners into play; the game of Truth and Power.

This discussion can be seen as an example of a Postmodern of Poststructuralist critique of European Knoweledge. This discussion can also be seen as part of Kaupapa Maori Theory, in its critique of European philosophical paradigms that have positioned Maori as the Other. As part of Kaupapa Maori critique, it addresses the realisation that the colonising agenda was/is the agenda of Subjectification and Objectification. Kaupapa Maori Theory can also be seen as a critique of dualistic
thinking which lies at the base of all European philosophical paradigms; at the base of Philosophy itself.

The philosophical heritage of Europe has imposed its Subjectivity upon Te Iwi Maori. The New Right neo-liberal, neo-classical theorising paradigm has imposed its philosophy and its praxis upon Te Iwi Maori. My discussion here does not propose a 'way out' for Pakeha. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate to Pakeha that their realities have been informed by a uniquely dualistic European philosophical heritage; one that they can't ignore! My purpose is to remind Pakeha that they are not removed from their colonial, historical, philosophical roots. Their identity can no longer be taken for granted!

ENLIGHTENMENT - WHAT ENLIGHTENMENT?

The Enlightenment narrative goes something like this. According to Liberalism, Man is born ignorant and throughout his life he is conditioned by a social environment that in many ways has been the product of the errors and injustices of the past. This is very much the Christian mode of thinking and rationalising man's condition. In order to remedy this tragedy, Man strives for Enlightenment.

Mankind has always "been advancing steadily to an ever better civilization. The liberal way is the way "of the inevitability of gradualness" in the progress of mankind". (J.Schapiro 1958:13). As such, Liberalism posits a beginning and an end; a sense of striving implicit in the journey. Savagery, native or indigenous is posited as the beginning; civilisation as the end. Oral language is posited as the beginning; print literacy is the end. Maori land as 'waste land' is the beginning; 'developed' land as a commodity is the end.

This direction to human history presupposes that the various regions of the world are all directed towards the same 'developed end'. In actuality, this is the history of all Colonisation. The ideal is always in the future, never here and now. Maori must stop living in the past.
This totalising metanarrative, includes the narrative of "constant development and adaptation proposed under the rubric of evolution by Darwin". (T.Docherty 1993:11). Other master narratives would include the great narrative of emancipation proposed by Marx, the narrative of the possibility of psychoanalytic therapy and redemption proposed by Freud. 

Liberals have believed in the existence of objective truth, discoverable through the process of reason and rational endeavour. The Liberal education system that exists today in Aotearoa is premised on the Enlightenment model of the progress of mankind: the model of the developing child is the inevitable traveller in this gradual narrative of progress and truth. Children are posited as vessels in need of filling up.

Foucault’s Subject is premised on the search (by others, as professionals), and by the Self, for some deep, inner, underlying essence of being. Consciousness is created in order to legitimate the creator. The mind is created in order to think thought. Foucault contends that there is no deep, inner, essence. The Subject is merely a creation of a dichotomising consciousness.

Totalization is accomplished only in history. The notion of History is problematic. History of course empathises with the victors. The victors legitimate their victory at the moment of the historian’s writing. These are posited as the documents of civilisation. Continuous history and the Subject are dependent on each other.

European Philosophical paradigms have promoted the belief that Man’s reflection on himself will change Man. The Postmodern, Postcolonial and Poststructural theoretical paradigms adhere to this dictum, thereby aligning themselves with the paradigms that they seek to ‘get out’ of. The reality is that Man’s reflection on himself leaves him ‘melting into air’, his solidity in dissolution.

In conclusion of this chapter I suggest that the history of European Philosophy is the history of dualistic thinking. European philosophy is built or perpetuated through dualisms, dialectics and dichotomies; competing discourses and oppositions. As such
these philosophical structures rely on the concept of an essential authentic Self, that remains hidden, that requires the elimination of all that is considered foreign or Other to itself. Colonisation is philosophy in practice.

As Robert Young (1990) has written, the fundamental problem concerns the way in which "knowledge - and therefore theory, or history - is constituted through the comprehension and incorporation of the other". (R.Young 1990:12).

An understanding of Hegel's Master/Slave dialectic is crucial here. Hegel articulates a philosophical structure of the appropriation of the other as a form of knowledge which simulates the project of nine-teenth century imperialism and colonialism. As Young elaborates, the construction of knowledges, which all operate through forms of expropriation and incorporation of the other, "mimic at a conceptual level the geographical and economic absorption of the non-European world by the West". (R.Young 1990:3).

Knowledge as such pivots at the theoretical level of the dialectic of the Same and the Other. This knowledge is "centred in a self even though it is outward looking, searching for power and control of what is other to it. (ibid:4). The Other is first constituted by the Same through its negation as Other before being incorporated within it (ibid.).

European philosophical paradigms operate through negation and incorporation, through opposition. Here, logo-centrism, and Euro-centrism go hand in hand with phallos-centrism. Examples abound in philosophical theorising: Man/Woman, Man/Nature, form/matter, body/mind, Man/God head/heart, black/white, Master/Slave. Each couple is based on the repression of one of its terms. The Other is appropriated, captured and destroyed. In dualistic thinking, difference is always perceived as an opposition. The dualistic mind does not let difference be. As Agnes Heller (1984:25) points out - "The history of philosophy is a history of philosophical polemics".
Each philosophy claims for itself universal validation, whilst questioning the truth of other philosophies. Every philosophy constitutes and constructs itself through the critique of another or other systems. Heller elaborates that Plato polemised against the Sophists, Aristotle against Plato, Descartes against Aristotle, Hobbes and Descartes polemised against each other, Spinoza against Descartes, Liebniz against Spinoza, Locke against Hobbes, Feuerbach against Hegel, Marx against Hegel and so on. (ibid.).

This chapter has been a contestation of Western-European culture. Using Foucault’s analyses, I have shown that the construction of the European individual, who is credited with characteristics such as freedom, rights, autonomy, rationality and reason, is problematic. The individual is nothing more than a Subject who has been constructed as such by European philosophical paradigms; such as Liberalism. Furthermore, European forms of Philosophy, European Theory and dualistic thinking or theorising are constituted through the comprehension and incorporation of the Other. The pre-dominance of New Right possessive individualism in the Western World today would suggest that Foucault is not far off the mark - the European Subject has lost its Self Control.

In the following chapter, I will address specifically the notion of Maori as the Other. As European philosophical modes of thought/Theory have manufactured the construction of the European Subject; so, these same modes of thought/Theory have been imposed on Maori. Here it is not Maori as the Same or centre, but Maori as the ‘shadowed’ Other, who exists somewhere on the periphery.